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Abstract
Knowledge-based Decision Making for Simulating Cyber Attack Behaviors
Stephen Frank Moskal
Supervising Professor: Dr. Shanchieh Jay Yang
Computer networks are becoming more complex as the reliance on these network in-
creases in this era of exponential technological growth. This makes the potential gains
for criminal activity on these networks extremely serious and can not only devastate or-
ganizations or enterprises but also the general population. As complexity of the network
increases so does the difficulty to protect the networks as more potential vulnerabilities are
introduced. Despite best efforts, traditional defenses like Intrusion Detection Systems and
penetration tests are rendered ineffective to even amateur cyber adversaries. Networks now
need to be analyzed at all times to preemptively detect weaknesses which harbored a new
research field called Cyber Threat Analytics. However, current techniques for cyber threat
analytics typically perform static analysis on the network and system vulnerabilities but few
address the most variable and most critical piece of the puzzle – the attacker themselves.
This work focuses on defining a baseline framework for modeling a wide variety of
cyber attack behaviors which can be used in conjunction with a cyber attack simulator to
analyze the effects of individual or multiple attackers on a network. To model a cyber at-
tacker’s behaviors with reasonable accuracy and flexibility, the model must be based on
aspects of an attacker that are used in real scenarios. Real cyber attackers base their de-
cisions on what they know and learn about the network, vulnerabilities, and targets. This
attacker behavior model introduces the aspect of knowledge-based decision making to cy-
ber attack behavior modeling with the goal of providing user configurable options. This
behavior model employs Cyber Attack Kill Chain R©along with an ensemble of the attacker
v
capabilities, opportunities, intent, and preferences. The proposed knowledge-based deci-
sion making model is implemented to enable the simulation of a variety of network attack
behaviors and their effects. This thesis will show a number of simulated attack scenarios to
demonstrate the capabilities and limitations of the proposed model.
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1.1 Importance of Cyber Security
As the world becomes more and more technologically advanced and reliant on computers
to keep track of their lives or run their businesses, the importance of keeping these systems
secure becomes critical in every day life. However, in most cases, people do not realize how
important cyber security is until their credit card numbers are stolen or their customers data
is taken. This ignorance only has been realized widespread in late-2013 when the large
corporation Target was infected with malware compromising the identities of over 70 mil-
lion people worldwide [38]. FireEye, the company who was monitoring Target’s network
at the time, reports that the median number of days between when the attack is successful
to when the attack is discovered is 146 days [8]. Even though Target had many defenses
implemented and detected the malware relatively early, enterprise level networks still can
be extremely difficult and expensive to secure due to the configuration of the network like
the services installed and access control.
To combat cyber attacks, defense tools and tactics like firewalls, intrusion detection
systems (IDS), and penetration testing are used to help mitigate these threats. However
most tools like firewalls and IDS’s only protect from attacks that are happening live and
if they fail, there is nothing they can do further. Penetration testing, although can be very
effective, is only performed at the time of the test and it effectiveness relies on the skills
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of the tester. The issues with these techniques is that if the attacker has compromised the
network in some way, it’s usually too late. This is why recently the research community has
focused performing analytics on cyber attacks and threats to measure the effects and impact
of certain attacks before the attack can actually happen. Cyber-threat analytics fills the gap
between detecting cyber attacks and defending against cyber attacks predicting what could
happen in various scenarios.
1.2 Difficulty in Cyber Threat Analytics
Prediction in any field of work is usually expected to come with some amount of uncertainty
and inaccuracies, with meteorology being the extreme case since that is almost never 100
percent correct. As expected cyber attacks are no exception to this proposition however
unlike weather prediction which has literally hundreds of years of previous weather data,
there is little available data of detailed cyber attack information to base predictions off
of. The issue is because of the sensitivity and complexity of this data most of the victims
are hesitant to release this information. Sensitivity in the sense that releasing detailed
information about an attack can expose even more vulnerabilities and information against
them which could also negatively impact them from a business standpoint. These attacks
are also complex requiring detailed logs and step-by-step analysis of vulnerabilities and
techniques used during the attack which needs the actual attacker’s input to retrieve that
data. Like meteorology where robustness is added to models of the weather to become as
accurate as possible without physically modeling every variable possible, same concept can
be applied to cyber attack modeling to reduce the number of variables to make up for the
high uncertainly models. By modeling the networks and cyber attacks to various degrees it
is possible make up for the lack of data to synthesize the effects of these attacks.
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1.3 Variability of a Cyber Attack
To understand the difficulty of the prediction and modeling of a cyber attack, understanding
the variability and complexity of an attack is key. First, the network and its configuration
plays a major role in an attack. An average network may be hundreds to thousands of ma-
chines with various permissions, programs, and protection. Each of these dictate the sort
of attacks that could happen on the network and is critical modeling an attack with some
amount of realism. Permissions dictate whom can communicate, whom can be accessed
from the Internet, etc. Access control is key to stopping unauthorized users accessing
someone who they should not. Programs or services installed on a machine in a network
defines the types of vulnerabilities that are available to an attacker. Management of the ser-
vices can reduce the types of attacks that can happen on the machine. Then lastly the cyber
attack defenses implemented on a network, a firewall for example, can impede attackers
and possibly detecting attackers during the attack acting as a deterrent. It is obvious that
to model the effects of an attack on the network that you must model a network but there
is variability in the sense of the granularity the network is modeled. One may choose to
model the network at a packet-level or use a real network, each has their pros and cons.
At a high level however, networks are relatively static and only introduces variability
in the terms of what is possible in an attack. However the most variable aspect of a cyber
attack is the attacker themselves. Modeling only the network could reveal what is possible
to be done from an vulnerability perspective, but not whether or not it is actually possible to
be done by someone. Since every human is different, the process at which an attacker will
attack a network will vary between each attacker. This is interesting from a research per-
spective since by modeling the attacker one can not only see if their network is vulnerable
but how it is vulnerable. Given the same network one attacker may approach the network
differently than another, take different paths, and use different vulnerabilities which may
effect the network very differently. One attacker maybe successful in ex-filtrating a critical
asset in the network and leave little traces over the course of many days, while another
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may run in and take what they can find quickly setting off many alarms. Understanding the
differences between attackers and their behaviors can be used to analyze the effects of the
attacks and then can be used for early detection and prediction later.
Interesting research has been conducted in the past 10 years to address the variability
in cyber attacks and cyber attack behaviors to better analyze the impact of these attackers.
On one side research has been done in using the vulnerabilities in the network to expose
possible and realistic attack paths [18, 36, 52, 12]. However the downside to this approach
is that these techniques only takes in account the vulnerabilities on the network exposing
no real differences between types of attackers. Other works have addressed this issue by
modeling the capabilities and opportunities of adversaries [46] or applying the method-
ology of Game Theory [50] to model the attacker and defense. None of these methods
model the attacker based of information that the attacker gains throughout the attack. The
information the attacker gains throughout the attack plays a critical role into what decisions
the attacker makes. This concept can be seen in the agent based modeling techniques in
the adversary simulation tool NeSSi2 [15] and the attacker behavior model in the Multi-
stage Attack Scenario Simulation (MASS) [31]. These however fail to provide a structure
in which the attacker learns specific details about the targets and be able to dynamically
change goals and strategies through out the attack. This sort of knowledge based design
to model an attacker allows for a flexible description of cyber attackers that provides the
capability to model proactive and reactive behaviors.
1.4 Problem Statement
Previous works have identified two major factors that are dependent on each other for
accurate prediction and modeling of cyber threats: the network configuration and the at-
tacker. However this dependency between the threat and the target plays a role in both how
successful an attacker is to achieving their goal and how secure the network is. Theoret-
ically, if the network is perfectly secure then regardless of the attacker skill the attacker
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should not be successful in achieving their goal. Likewise, a world-class attacker may find
paths and vulnerabilities that professionals and analysts may miss due to the complexity of
the network configurations and possibilities. This is the ongoing problem that penetration
testers and threat analytic tools have tried to solve, expose possible vulnerabilities in a net-
work. However, the other issue is how to analyze this dependency between the attacker and
network and measure effects the attacker has on a network but also how network’s config-
uration effects the behaviors and intentions of the attacker. Current works that do address
both the attacker and the network configurations face issues with: generating realistic at-
tack scenarios, are inflexible with the types of attacks modeled, or are extremely difficult to
configure to model certain scenarios. This is again due to the complexity of the attacker’s
decision processes themselves and with the number of variables to consider when modeling
a network. This work strives to find a balance between the model complexity of the cyber
attacker along with the description of the network to measure the effects each of the models
have on one another by examining the attacker’s actions taken when attacking a network.
1.5 Motivation for Cyber Attack Behavior Modeling
The motivation for this work is continuing on previous work by Moskal et al. [30, 31]
where cyber attacks where modeled and simulated to analyze the possible attacks that could
happen on the network. The main focus of this work is to model the cyber attacker’s
behavior in a manner that allows for flexible description of many different types of attackers
while maintaining reasonable realism in the types of attacks that can be performed. By
modeling an attacker more like the way an attacker would actually think, this allows us
to understand the differences different attackers have on the same network or how a single
attacker can effect different types of network. This flexibility may help to alleviate the skills
and time needed to perform this type of analysis on a network. The key goal is to develop a
framework to model the decision process of an attacker based on both deterministic factors
like the network and knowledge but also probabilistic factors to allow for randomness in
5
simulation. While the goal is not to be able to comprehensively model every type of attacker
behavior but to identify what needs to be modeled to describe an attacker, much like what
was identified for the network above.
By modeling cyber attackers more akin to how an actual cyber attacker would make
decisions based on skills, rules, and knowledge, it is possible synthesize attacker behavior
data that would be difficult to achieve otherwise. Combining both rule based and knowl-
edge based attack action generation provides robust and diverse attack track generations
while still providing realistic results because rules and knowledge are in constant check
with each other. Meaning that the rules can not be applied if the knowledge is not devel-
oped enough and the flexibility of the knowledge can’t be used if the rules are too restrictive.
Applying this design to simulations allows for a deeper understanding of what is the impact
of many different types of attackers by analyzing the types of attacks were performed and
being able to what the attacker needed to know to perform the attacks. Then finally this
feeds back to the possible end user who is trying to protect their networks from attacks that
penetration testers did not think of or other tools that do not have the defenses to defend
against. This gives a deeper understanding of how the vulnerabilities are being used and





Cyber-threat analytics is a relatively young field and is diverse in the types of approaches
taken to perform predictive analysis of cyber attackers. These approaches consist of vul-
nerability assessments and mitigation, analytical approaches such as using attack graphs
and game theory, and cyber attack modeling and simulation. Each have their own benefits
and downfalls, where no approach is necessarily better than another due to the difficulty of
predicting human behavior in the first place. In the later part of this chapter, we will shear
the trade off between model accuracy, description flexibility, and ease of use. In the current
work, one or two of three of these aspects are satisfied while significantly impacting the
other aspects. Current works use mathematical models such as attack graph generation or
game theory or other more theoretical approaches such as agent based modeling, attack
ontologies, or simulations to aid in the analysis of adversaries.
2.1 Attack Graph Generation and Analysis
The purpose of network penetration test is to expose potential weaknesses in a network
that is available to a potential attacker. With knowing the vulnerabilities of a network,
the tester/attacker can then exploit them to further penetrate the network to learn more
information. A penetration tester will use this information to expose more weaknesses
until they have exhausted all their possible options. This is developing what is known as
an attack graph which is a collection of all the possible paths an attacker could follow in a
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network. This process was traditionally done by hand either by the attacker or the analysis
team and can be a tedious process. In 2002, Sheyner et al.[44] formalized the process to
automatically generate an exhaustive set of possible attack graphs given a network. Attack
graphs are generated using by describing the network and the attacker’s knowledge of that
network and then describing the set of states that describe the actual attacks that can happen.
Given a large network the number of possible attack paths could be extremely large.
The follow up work by Jha et al.[19] proposed two methods to find which attack graphs
are most critical and which defense techniques are most effective. The automatic attack
graph generation still requires every different type of possible attack to be modeled. In
their paper, Jha et al.only 4 possible types of attacks. In the case of Sheyner et al.[44] a
network of two hosts with a IDS and firewall was modeled. This produced an attack graph
of 5948 nodes with 68364 edges which is extremely large for very few types of attacks
and an unrealistically small network. This method of analysis does not have the flexibility,
scalability, or the ease of use needed to successfully assess the networks weaknesses.
Qui et al.[36] in 2004 used attack graphs to generate patterns of IDS alerts to aid in
the prediction of future and ongoing attacks. Using these attack graphs and cyber attack
domain knowledge, the likelihood of attack goals being performed can be evaluated to pre-
dict future attacks. Immediately, this is an issue because this method requires every attack
graph to be converted into a casual network and a cyber security expert must analyze it it
for its likelihood. This has two problems, first attacks that do not strictly follow the attack
plan cannot be modeled and the likelihood is based solely on the expertise of the expert. In
2010, Xie et al.[52] addressed this uncertainty of variation of attacks, successfulness, and
accuracy of sensor alert data by combining attack graphs with Bayesian networks. This
introduced bringing in real world vulnerability databases like the National Vulnerability
Database (NVD) and the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) to use real world
data to give some basis for the likelihood without needing expert knowledge for every fea-
ture.
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In 2014, Kotenko et al.[24] evaluates real-time attack graph generation for predicting
the likelihood of the attacker’s next steps based off of various security events. From the
security event, a base skill level of the attacker can be determined which then can be used
with CVSS to determine the possibility of the next steps based on the position of the at-
tacker on the network. A common issue between the aforementioned works is developing
the base attack graph that describes the scenario and goals of the attacker. With the use of
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) from MITRE, Kotenko
et al.[25] was able to generate attack graphs based off the real-world scenarios and use
those scenarios to provide more realistic predictions and other attack graphs based off their
previous works.
2.2 Behavioral Models
In the previous section, the works presented analyzes the network security based off the
possible attacks that could be performed on the network given one or more scenarios. In
these cases, the scenarios are defined and different attackers could share the same goal but
whether or not they are successful is a different problem. Understanding the attacker’s
impact on the network is important because realistically not every vulnerability can be
closed and some may prioritize which vulnerabilities to address due to time. If there is a
exploit that can be performed by any person and have a detrimental impact to the network
(ex. Heartbleed from 2014) should have a higher priority than an exploit that only the top
1% of attackers could perform on a non critical machine. The earlier attack graph works
from Jha et al.[19] and Qui et al.[36] only exposed various paths an attacker could take
and not whether or not an attacker would. Where the more recent attack graph works such
as Xie et al.[52] and Kotenko et al.[25] used publicly available cyber attack scenario data
to create attack paths that were identified as realistic but still not accounting for attacker
skills or behaviors. Current techniques, as shown in this section, apply techniques like
game theory or agent based modeling to capture the behaviors and the decision processes
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an attacker makes throughout an attack.
2.2.1 Game Theory
Applying game theory to the cyber domain seems to be a fitting application because cyber
security naturally has two players which are most commonly referred to as the red team vs
the blue team. The red team are the attackers who are trying to penetrate the network to
achieve some goal. The blue team are the defenders, which could be the network admin-
istrator, the penetration testers, or the intrusion detection system. Game theory works well
in this case because the red and blue team have contradictory goals and they are compet-
ing against each other. The red team is trying to break the defenses of the blue team and
the blue team is trying to stop the red team at any phase. Roy et al.[39] in 2010 performed
comprehensive research of various cyber security related game theory works and compared
their usefulness. They came to three conclusions: 1) Current stochastic game models only
consider perfect information and assume the defender can detect every attack. 2) State
transition probabilities are fixed and do not consider changing knowledge in the model and
3) Models assume that all actions are synchronous (every action has a reaction) which is
not realistic since the defense is not always aware of the offense and vise versa.
Since then, Wang et al.[50] improved on the attacker versus defense relationship by
introducing the Nash equilibrium and having a non-cooperative offensive vs. defensive
model. This provided significant gains in network security yet also, proved to be computa-
tionally intensive even with an unreasonable assumption that the skills of the attacker’s are
all equal. In 2016 machine learning was applied with game theory by Chung et al.[5] to aid
in reducing false positives. As mentioned in [39], IDS’s are never 100 percent correct. It
was also assumed that the defense does not have any knowledge about the attacker’s skill
or intent. Q-Learning was used as a model-free reinforcement learning technique to learn
the optimal policy that will maximize the effectiveness of the technique being used. This
method was found to respond well against focused attackers and even random attackers,
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where the data for the attacker’s were developed from National Center of Supercomputing
Applications (NCSA) where only a few attacker behaviors were present.
2.2.2 Agent Based Behavior Modeling
Agent based modeling is a technique that measures the effect of one or many autonomous
agents on a particular system. Agent based modeling is used to re-create and predict the
behaviors of very complex algorithms by using a very simple rule based system. Agent
based modeling is popular in applications that exhibit a swarm like behavior like epidemic
spreads [2] or the interaction of crowds of people in an area [34]. For example, the people
in the crowd are agents and they are monitoring their speed, the position of other people,
and trying to get to their goal which is a position in the system. Each agent is simply trying
to minimize the time it takes to arrive at their goal, however other agents may impede each
other. Bottlenecks can be then found in the system by examining the areas in which the
most agents slow down [27]. Recently, this same methodology and technique was applied
to the cyber security domain taking various approaches to defining the agents.
In 2005, Kotenko [22] applied the Agent Based Model to describe the interactions of
botnets in a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. Kotenko modeled the steps and
actions to successfully perform a DDoS attack including the different initialized agents
needed to perform the simulation. Two different types of agents were used in this work,
the adversary attacking system which are the automated botnets attacking the system and
then the security defense system which is the intrusion detection systems (IDS) and fire-
walls. For each type of agent, a state machine was created to describe the functionality
and behaviors of the agent. For the attacker agent, the state machine comprised of the
steps and outcomes of seven different methods to perform a DDoS. On the defense side,
the agents were trained to perform certain scans on different levels of the network model
(system, network, and global) and report their findings whether or not malicious activity
was found. Then in 2011, Kotenko [23] applied this methodology to a simulator using
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NS2 and the OMNeT++ INET Framework. Where normal users, attackers, and defend-
ers were modeled together and the effects of a botnet was examined on a network. It was
shown that the collaborative team based attacks were much more successful at performing
a comprehensive DDoS attack on a network, as one would predict.
Then in 2011, Grunewald et al.[15] released an Agent based adversary detection and
simulation tool called NeSSi2. The methodology was to model the entire network and at-
tackers as agents in a packet based simulation to avoid complex mathematical models. The
provided a simulation that could handle many different types of scenarios that could not be
easy to perform in a real world environment. Each machine, router, and firewall are created
as agents in an attempt to detect and identify DoS attacks in the network. NeSSi2 supports
two types of attacks, Worm-spread scenarios which is similar to an epidemic spread prob-
lem and botnet based attack like seen before. Each attacker is also modeled as an agent,
picking one of these attacks and performing it on the network. NeSSi2 simulates basic web
traffic like HTTP requests and other applications in the hopes that the attacker’s behaviors
can be identified in the simulation.
2.2.3 Cyber Attack Ontologies
Cyber attack ontologies describes the relationships between each of the factors of a cyber
attack and their dependencies on each other. For example, it can describe all of the details
in a vulnerability for it to be possible, like services and OS’s, user permissions, down to
the requirements of the attacker like specific domain knowledge. The ontology can be
described in a low level like specific vulnerabilities or the attacker’s individual behaviors
to very high level to just the attacker’s high level intentions. In 2002, Gorodetski et al.[14]
applied the methodology to the cyber domain and described the requirements of the top
level ontology of a cyber attacker in three steps. First, all attacks are intention centered
meaning that there must be a reason for the attack. Second, attacks correspond to the
response of the adversary domain. This means that each attack depends on the output from
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attacking the target network. Lastly, an attack intention can be represented as a collection
of sub-intentions. This is describing the multistage attacks where there may be multiple
steps before the attacker can achieve their overall goal.
Shepard et al.[43] in 2005 used their knowledge-based artificial intelligence inference
system called CycSecure to develop a knowledge base about an network to perform secu-
rity analysis. By running a set of Cyc daemons on the host machines on a network the
Cyc system can develop the base map of the network and then ontologies developed from
security experts and natural language processing from various sets of data (not disclosed)
can be used to analyze the network. Cyc provides support for over 12,000 services, 683
vulnerability types, 354 types of software faults at the time. However these ontologies still
need to be reviewed by a security expert and the authors admit that each of the ontologies
require 10-20 minutes of review each. In 2010 Conesa et al.[9] analyzed the usability of
the more versatile and general version of CycSecure called ResearchCyc and found it to be
unorganized, difficult to use, and inflexible with out expert knowledge makes it difficult to
use for research purposes. There has been no response to this paper and no further progress
on CycSecure as been made since.
The Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) from MITRE is a schema co-
developed with the Department of Homeland Security to better describe cyber threat in-
formation. The STIX schema captures high-level concepts such as observables/indicators,
incidents, TTP (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures), targets, courses of action, and threat
actors. This framework also defines what is called the “Cyber Kill Chain” which describes
the phases or steps an attacker commonly takes throughout the overall campaign. An ex-
ample of the different stages of the cyber kill chain can be seen in Figure 2.1.
The different “sides” of the attacks are important because it depending on what side the
attacker is on, different defensive measures need to be taken. The left side of the kill chain
represents the preparation phase of the attack where preventative defensive techniques can
be used to impede the progress of the attacker. Likewise if the attacker is on the right side
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Figure 2.1: Example of the cyber kill chain defined by MITRE.
of the attack, the attacker has compromised the target in some way and the defensive strat-
egy changes to a damage control focus instead of preventative techniques. STIX focuses
on individual attack campaigns and organizes it to represent the attack and the kill chain
position by the tools the threat actor used, techniques/behaviors they exhibit, the interaction
between threat actors, and the observables.
2.3 Cyber Attack Simulators and Analysis Tools
Simulation is an appealing approach to cyber-threat analytics because it provides repeat-
able results can is relevant to the specific application of the user. Simulations are usually
robust and can be tuned to provide different results under certain circumstances. However
as with most simulations, the simulation is only as good as the model being simulated.
In manufacturing processes where simulations are widely used for measuring process effi-
ciency, specific parameters and variables are defined to describe the possible actions in the
simulation like part failure rates for example. In the case of cyber attacks the complexity is
much higher because the variability of the network, complexity of the vulnerabilities, and
the attacker themselves has to be taken into account.
Mentioned previously NeSSi2 from Grunewal et al.[15] developed a cyber attack sim-
ulator in which a network was modeled and simulated the effects of distributed denial of
service (DDoS) attacks and work propagation. NeSSi2 performs well in applications where
there is propagation of some threat not only in cyber attack applications but also testing the
security of smart grids[4] in one case. Where NeSSi is strong in automated attacks like
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DDoS, it does not model various other types of cyber attacks that require compromising
multiple machines as it is focused on modeling the defense for DDoS attacks mostly.
In 2014, Moskal et al.[31] developed the Multistage Attack Scenario Simulator (MASS)
which is the predecessor to the Cyber Attack Scenario and Network Defense Simulator
(CASCADES) used in this work. MASS introduced the idea of modeling cyber attacks
by modeling the network and its services which determines the vulnerabilities on the net-
work along with describing a cyber attack scenario with the use of the Scenario Guidance
Template (SGT). MASS also factored in the attacker’s behavior by modeling the skills and
preferences of the attacker. This produced reasonable results for a given attack scenario
producing multistage attacks using real vulnerability data and modeling intrusion detection
systems. Where it fell short was that it did not actually model the attackers personality nor
did it model the actual actions that the attacker could perform. Instead the behaviors were
abstracted down to some numeric parameters like stealthiness or persistence which where
difficult to describe and configure. The simulator itself was unpredictable and extremely
difficult to configure but it laid out the framework and base for the next generator simulator
CASCADES.
2.4 Summary
Modeling cyber attacks and attackers is a difficult problem because of all the possibilities.
Attack graphs are shown to be useful but provide scalability issues that is dependent on
network description and flexibility issues because of the massive amount of possible attack
scenarios available. Simulation is an interesting concept and still a growing field but is hard
to prove its validity because of the lack of cyber attack data available. In simulation there
is a trade off between realism of attack scenarios because the simulation can be custom
tailored to a single attack type and being able to simulate a wide variety of scenarios with
potentially less accuracy. This work presents a method to generate attack plans and scenar-






Current techniques of modeling cyber attacker behaviors either lack the robustness to pro-
vide realistic attack scenarios or fail to reflect the reactive and dynamic nature of cyber
attackers, as noted previously. To achieve realistic cyber attacker behaviors it is necessary
to understand what is a cyber attack at a high level. Then to address the dynamics of an
attack it is important to understand the decision process an attacker makes throughout an
attack. What makes one cyber attacker different to another? This can be answered by
looking at what makes one person different from another person, completely leaving out
the cyber aspect out of it. Identical twins for example are biologically the same/similar but
it is their experiences, their skills, and what they know that makes them different to their
identical counterpart. Describing a person’s full skill set or experiences is impractical as
the complexity of the model will be unreasonable. The main goal of this work is to identify
key components of a cyber attacker and assess the realism and flexibility of modeling cyber
attack behaviors in this form.
3.1 Making of a Cyber Attacker
The purpose of this work is not to model every possible behavior a cyber attacker may
have but to develop a framework to investigate information needed to sufficiently model
a variety of attacks. The reasons why a person would target and attack a network can be
related to the general motivations of any crime and not just the cyber domain. U.S. criminal
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law defines three aspects of a crime which can be applied to any crime: means, motive, and
opportunity. Means is the ability the adversary could commit the crime, motive is the reason
the adversary committed the crime, and opportunity is if the adversary had the chance to
commit the crime. This can be applied to cyber attacks as the means whether the attacker
has the skills to perform the attack, the motive is the goals and intent the attacker has for
performing an attack, and opportunity is the vulnerabilities on the network. Holsopple
et al.[16] touched upon this by using the capabilities and opportunities of ongoing attacks
to predict future attack scenarios. The definition of a cyber threat as given by Gasper from
U.S. ARL [13] is the combination as capabilities, opportunity, and intent (COI) lining up
with the law definition. These three aspects of a cyber threat are critical in describing the
skills, goals, and attack surfaces the attacker has on a network.
The issue of describing cyber attackers with only COI is that it does not describe the
personality of the attacker. For example two attackers may have similar skill sets, the same
intent, and are exposed to the same attack surface. What is left out is how the attacker
uses skills and opportunity. One attacker may choose to be extremely aggressive and attack
as fast as possible, getting in and out regardless of the alarms that were set off. Where
another may choose to be very methodical in choosing their next attack and staying “under
the radar” as much as possible. These differences need to be taken into consideration as
these have very different impacts on the victim network. Comparing and contrasting these
two examples are interesting as they have the same COI but the approaches and outcomes
are very different. The first attacker may have been detected and some threat mitigation
could have been performed, but the second one may have not been detected and it is critical
to understand how they can be detected. This work proposes that not only capabilities,
opportunity, and intent are required to model a cyber attacker but the preferences of the
attacker must be considered to allow for diverse models.
The attacker behavior is defined as the decision process to develop a sequence of attack
actions that represents certain characteristics of an attacker. The attacker will use their
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capabilities, opportunity, intent, and preferences (COI+P) to choose an attack action which
is only part of their overall behavior. However the order in which the COI+P is used has
a drastically different meaning to the overall decision process. We propose to order these
as intent, opportunity, capabilities, and preferences. Intent is first because the attacker
will have some reason/goal for the attack. This goal can be as high level as just affecting as
many machines as possible or to extract some information from a particular server. Without
intent being first, there is no meaning to why the attacker is attacking the network. Then
opportunity to perform the intent is second due to the attacker knowing what they want to
do and the opportunity is if they know enough to perform the attacker’s intent. The notion
of the attacker knowing information about the target is a topic that will be addressed later.
If the attacker does not have the opportunity for the intent, then the attacker must reevaluate
their next steps. Next, is the capabilities of the attacker which determines if the attacker
has the skills to perform the intent actions if they have the opportunity. It is unlikely that
an attacker will address their skill set before their intent and opportunities. Then lastly, is
what does the attacker prefer to perform. With their COI determined, there may be many
different options available to the attacker and this can only be realized after the other three
have been determined.
This is the logical organization of each of these models, however it is recognized that
this is not necessarily the optimal order for all cases. As seen later in the design, the order
will not play a large role in determining an action. It does change the literal meaning of the
process. For example if the capabilities is taken in account first then it would seem that the
attacker is developing their attack around their skill set which may be the case for some, but
most attacks are developed around some goal. This COI+P framework describes at a high
level of how an attack action chosen but still does not define a structure of how real attacks
progress. COI+P provides no logical structure of the types of attacks an attacker performs
in real situations. To provide this, the structure of an attack scenario must be examined.
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3.2 Cyber Attack Scenario Frameworks
There has been large debate on what steps an attacker makes to compromise a network. The
military defense contractor Lockheed Martin developed the Cyber Attack Kill Chain R©[1]
in 2013 which defined a set of steps an attacker would take to complete a specific goal.
These steps include reconnaissance, exploitation, installation of malware, and extraction to
name a few. This gives a solid baseline of the steps it takes to take control over a network
but does not encompass the types of scenarios for all of the attacks. It certainly does not
necessarily apply to all of the types of attacks or attackers, some may not choose to clean
their traces where others will certainly cover their tracks. Since then other companies have
developed their own definitions of a kill chain that applies to their particular field. As seen
in Table 3.1 is different versions of kill chains defined by other companies.
Although these kill chains range from typical cyber attacks to specific types of cyber
attacks, there are some patterns that are present in most of them. It can be seen that most of
the defined kill chains share three states: reconnaissance, breach, and exfiltration. Recon is
critical to an attack because it is where the attacker discovers information about the network
and possible target(s). Breach is the exploitation phase, each attack consists of exploiting
a machine whether it is a denial of service or control of the machine. Finally the last stage
exfiltration is where the attacker will perform their goal like extracting data or taking down
a machine. We define the kill chain stages recon, breach, and exfiltration as the Minimum
Viable Kill Chain (MVKC). The MVKC is the minimum steps that the attacker must take
to provide realistic results for modeling. It is to note that these steps do not need to be
taken in order necessarily but is defined as the typical order of an attack. For example in a
multistage attack a attacker may not be able to perform their goal after they have breached
the first machine, more recon and breaching may need to be performed.
As shown, the MVKC is the minimum number of kill chain stages required to model
a realistic cyber attack but more stages may be required to describe more technical attack























































































































































































be implemented to account for different stages and the differences between them. Each
of these different stages all correspond to a different part of the attack or a different set
of actions. This poses an interesting issue because since there is no actual order for these
stages, when is it appropriate to “perform” one of these stages? When the attacker performs
recon over a breach is up to the attacker but what information is the decision based off of?
The answer is the same as any decision process in any field which is knowledge, what the
attacker knows.
3.3 Modeling the Attacker’s Knowledge
Knowledge plays a large role in the overall evolution of a cyber attack. What an attacker
knows about a network determines their next steps and how they will progress to achieve
their goal. Defining what key elements of an attack or network is important to model
as knowledge is necessary to then develop a model to describe how an attacker uses this
knowledge. It is important to note that in this context, knowledge refers to the informa-
tion known about a particular network and not the skills and experiences of the attacker
themselves. This is an important distinction as the overall decision making process takes in
account the knowledge gained from the network with the skills of the attacker. Modeling
the knowledge an attacker develops throughout an attack provides interesting benefits as it
provides realism in the sense that an attacker can only make decisions on information about
the network that is known about. Very rarely will an attacker perform a breach or exfiltra-
tion type attack without some prior knowledge. Even in the case of a random script kiddie,
there is still a discovery phase looking for targets in which the attacker is learning about
the field and searching for targets. As these random attacks fail, the “attacker” develops
more and more information about the target(s). This applies also to advanced meticulous
attackers that will learn about their network, understanding what is out there and choosing
their target carefully based on the types of services on the targets and skill sets they have.
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3.3.1 Skills, Rules, and Knowledge
Before describing the details of what needs to be represented as attacker’s knowledge, first
the description of a knowledge-based design should be defined. Using the knowledge as
the driving force of the decision-making process is a double-edged sword. On one side,
using knowledge provides the capability of realistic attack scenarios while being able to
understand what the attacker needed to know to perform that attack. While the other side
describing this sort of behavior may become complex from a user stand point, as one cannot
expect a user to describe all of the rules possible for the attacker. Applying case-based
approaches to the cyber domain like from Kolodneer [20] is not appropriate due to cyber
attackers not always following a ridged set of rules, as most cyber attacks are situational.
Where the skills, rules, and knowledge based design from Rasmussen [37] provides a much
more flexible design for how a cyber attacker makes decisions.
Rasmussen [37] defines three different types of decision making: skills, rules, and
knowledge. Skills are the impulsive decisions that are based off of experience like catching
a ball, you don’t think about it. The rule level is the “if... then” type of decisions similar to
the case based approaches. Where the knowledge level is where there is no direct solution
to the problem and the person has to think of a solution. An example of this is a physics
problem where the solution to the problem is not known however the person goes through
problem solving techniques to extract the solution out of what is known. This model is
a good fit in this case because it combines the deterministic problem solving in the case
where the attacker has a clear direction for the next attack attack action and also the more
probabilistic methods in the case that the next step is not well defined because the goal is
not possible at a given time for example. This work uses this design as a base to not strictly
rely on rules to define the attacker behaviors which will be addressed in the design and
configuration of the behavior model.
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3.3.2 Network Knowledge
Cyber attackers when infiltrating a network choose their actions based on some sort of
information that they have learned previously or during the attack. This applies to all
attackers from script kiddies to the most elite attackers. Script kiddies must have some
sort of target even if it is a shotgun approach where the attacker randomly targets machines
to discover if they are vulnerable, some knowledge is gained from this technique as it is
used to plan their next action depending on the result. Similarly elite hackers may have a
target in mind and will perform reconnaissance techniques to learn more information about
their target to carefully plan their next action. These statements above are vague as the
definition of information/knowledge gain in the context of a cyber attacker has not been
defined. Defining the set of data that an attacker can learn and most importantly use to
choose their actions plays a major role in the validity of a knowledge based model.
To define what is the critical information an attacker needs to perform an attack, it is
necessary to evaluate two popular tools that are used by hackers and penetration testers.
NMap[32], a network scanning tool, and Metasploit [28], a penetration testing tool, are
two pieces of software that are widely used in the field of computing security. NMap is the
standard program among hackers of all skill levels and understanding it is a critical step
for hackers to acquire more information about their target. NMap provides the capability
of discovering hosts, operating system fingerprinting, port scanning, and service scanning.
NMap also provides scripts for more advanced service detection, user privileges, and ex-
ploitation, however we are more interested in the base functionality as this is information
that every remote attack requires. Thus at a minimum, the attackers knowledge base must
contain IP addresses, open ports, operating system, and services running on the targets.
This is reinforced by evaluating the basic needs of Metasploit to perform an exploit. At the
very least to successfully compromise a machine, Metasploit requires some target IP(s), the
target port, and a service to exploit with the correct OS installed. Metasploit also requires
knowledge of the vulnerabilities on the target whether it is from skill or another tool, the
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attacker must know that the vulnerability exists on the network.
At a base, the knowledge needed to successfully perform an attack is IP addresses, open
ports, services, and vulnerabilities. The only major part that is left out is the actual topology
of the network itself. Both NMap (short for Network Map) and Metasploit is aware of
the permissions of the machines on the network when used correctly. It is critical to the
overall attack scenario that the attacker understands the network as a whole and who can
communicate with who. This is because certain machines can only be accessed by certain
other machines deeper down in the network due to firewalls and permissions. By modeling
the attacker’s awareness of permissions, it will allow the capability for attackers to base
decisions based of the source machine and target machines later on as a preference. This
allows the fine tuning of the attacker’s behavior in the case there is a specific preference to
use one source over another.
3.3.3 Opportunity: Using the Knowledge To Choose A Kill Chain Stage
One of the key design requirements of this knowledge-based behavior model is flexibility.
Instead of describing few behaviors in great detail like done in previous works, the goal is
to describe a wide variety of behaviors based off of real world parameters the reflect how
attackers react when they learn new information. Due to the nature of the data that the
simulated attacker is making decisions on (i.e., network sizes, services, service types, ma-
chines, etc.), probabilistic models like Game Theory for example may be difficult to define
many behaviors easily. Where a purely rule based system, while easier to define, struggles
to handle situations where there is no direct rule corresponding to the current situation. A
good model will provide the ease of a rule based system with the uncertainty and diversity
of a probabilistic model. Introducing Fuzzy Logic into this model is an appropriate choice
because it handles the case where there is uncertainty in what the attacker should do next
but still driven by a set of rules.
Cyber attackers themselves are not purely probabilistic nor are they purely rule based.
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Figure 3.1: Example setup of the linguistic variable “total failed actions” describing what is accept-
able and unacceptable
There is situations where the attacker will be unsure on their next steps because they may
not have enough information about their target to attack. This is where the fuzzy logic
plays a role since it takes into account that certain situations are not as simple as a coin flip
or a “if... then” rule. In this case, a set of input parameters from the simulation will be
the inputs to the fuzzy logic controller which then they will be used to drive the rules to
choose a kill chain stage. The user then can use these input parameters to configure a set of
thresholds or distributions that are used as the linguistic variables. The user then can also
describe the set of rules using the linguistic variables which will drive the membership for
each of the kill chain stages. This membership can be seen in Figure 3.1 where the variable
“total failed actions” is given as input to the fuzzy logic controller and is evaluated to either
acceptable or unacceptable based on value.
It should be noted that this model does not preserve any order of the kill chain stages
explicitly. In the descriptions of the kill chains from other organizations, each of them had
their own order in which the stages should be completed to correctly describe a complete
kill chain. This automatic ordering of the kill chain stages is left out in this model because
the criteria for entering a stage is purely situational and based off the opportunity to perform
these stages. If the user chooses to enforce the kill chain stage order then it is required to
add in a rule based off the completion of a previous stage explicitly instead of it being
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automatically enforced. The use cases for defining flexible ordering of states could be for
covering up traces after attacks or some other action that relies on a previous state.
3.3.4 Fuzzy Logic Parameters
The parameters that are used for the fuzzy logic as the inputs to determine the kill chain
stage must be defined carefully as the selection of the kill chain stage is critical to the
overall functionality of the ABM. These parameters must be flexible enough to control
many different types of attackers, scaleable to any size network, and most importantly based
off values real attackers make decisions based upon. Reflecting back on the MVKC of
Recon, Breach, and Exfiltration, a base set of variables can be created that can differentiate
the different stages the attacker can perform based off the knowledge. How these variables
are explicitly used will not be covered in this section because the usage is up to the user to
define the thresholds of the membership.
Addressing the requirements of the fuzzy parameters the first is flexibility. Each attacker
has their own agenda on what is their reasons to perform one of the kill chain states. For
example, one attacker may find that service scanning one machine out of 3 known is enough
to switch to the breach stage. Where another attacker may want to explore all the possible
actions before moving on. This also can be applied to when the attacker stops their attack.
Some attackers may not want to continue much farther after failing a few attempts. Whereas
an script kiddie for example may try every possibility before giving up. This allows for a
wide variety of behaviors that can be controlled by manipulating just a few parameters. The
general process of evaluating the kill chain membership can be seen in Figure 3.2
Figure 3.2: The flow of the kill chain stage selection using fuzzy logic showing the inputs of the
knowledge and intent.
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The next requirement in the parameters is that they must scale regardless of the network
size. This is because the behavior should be invariant to the size of the network. An
attacker from a small network should be able to be applied to a large network and the
only thing that should change is the number of steps taken. By no means does this mean
because an attacker is successful on a small network that they would be successful in an
enterprise network. What this means is that the ABM should not have to be changed if the
network has changed. For analysis purposes, one of the main goals of this work is to be
able to test a wide variety of behaviors over the same or different networks. An example
of invariance to scale is if we choose the variables for our rule set as the number of known
machines and number of service scans. The issue with these variables is that it is only an
ever increasing value as the attack progresses as the attacker is constantly learning more and
more information. Whereas if the ratio of these two parameters are taken in consideration,
the attacker can progress through the network learning as much information as they please
before moving on regardless of the network size.
Lastly to address the realism aspect of the these parameters. This is and will always be
a debated topic on what is and isn’t realistic. As mentioned before, the goal of this work
is not to make every attack as realistic as possible but to simulate them to a reasonable
level. Thus parameters must be defined in a manner where a real attacker will make these
“state transitions” upon. This work proposes the idea of taking into account newly acquired
knowledge. For example if an attacker finds out recently the services of an potential tar-
get machine, then the attacker may be inclined to target it to compromise. However this
has an interesting complication because what is considered “new” knowledge? What is
considered new for one attacker maybe very different than that of another attacker. This
work proposes a range in which the attacker finds information new for a fixed time period.
As the simulation progresses, information will become less “fresh” as more information is
uncovered and this is defined as the knowledge decay. With these requirements defined,
the base set of parameters are defined in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: The initial list of the fuzzy logic parameters available to the user from the simulation
Variables Description Values
Known Machines Number of machines known by the attacker 0-*
Service Scanned Number of machines scanned by the attacker 0-*
Scanned-Pinged Ratio Service Scanned Machines / Known Machines 0-1
Newly Discovered Number of machines ’recently’ discovered 0-*
Newly Scanned Number of machines ’recently’ service scanned 0-*
Newly Compromised Number of machines ’recently’ compromised 0-*
Newly Scanned-Pinged Ratio NewlyScannedMachines / NewlyDiscoveredMachines 0-1
Machines With Intent Number of machines with intent services known on them 0-*
Success Rate Over all types of attacks, successfulActions/allActions 0-1
Total Successful Actions Over all types of attacks, the count of successful actions 0-*
Total Failed Actions The total count of failed actions 0-*
No Attack Count Count of where the attacker failed to choose an attack 0-*
Each of these parameters are a representation of the information contained within the
knowledge base or the records about the attack its self. Known machines represents the
count of machines that the attacker has performed a discovery reconnaissance type action
upon and likewise service scanned is the count of those machines that a service discovery
reconnaissance type action has been performed upon. It is assumed that a machine must be
known before it can be service scanned, meaning that the service scanned machines will
always be less than or equal to the number of machines known. The ratio of these two
variables can be taken representing how thorough the attacker is to learning the maximum
possible information about the network available. A ratio of zero with a non-zero value for
known machines means the attacker has not service scanned any of the available machines
whereas a ratio of one denotes that the attacker has explored and service scanned every
possible machine and potentially knows all the possible information they can at that given
point of time.
To represent information based off of the time at which the information was learned, a
set of parameters called “newly discovered/scanned/compromised” is defined to describe
the time at which the machine was accessed. The attacker can decide what is consid-
ered newly learned information based on the number of attack steps from the current step
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that machines were discovered, scanned or compromised. This can be used to control the
thresholds on when the attacker will switch to recon to breach if machines were recently
scanned for example. Like with known machines and scanned machines, the ratio of the
newly discovered and scanned machines can be used to control how thorough an attacker is
to scan these individual machines. To address the differences between what each attacker
considers new knowledge, a decay function shown in (3.1) where s is the current attack
step, range is the number of steps the attacker back the attacker considers, and decay is the




decays−i ∗ numActionsi (3.1)
This decay function provides the capability to favor the knowledge that was most re-
cently gained and use it to determine the kill chain stage. The variable decay is used to
modify how much to favor knowledge from step to step and range is used as a limit to how
far back in the attack scenario to apply this decay function for the knowledge. If range
is set to zero, then all of the knowledge will be considered. A separate decay function is
defined for discovered, scanned, and compromised machines allowing the possibility of
independently controlling each of the knowledge variables.
To aid the attacker in performing their intent, the machines with intent variable is de-
fined for the fuzzy logic. This counts all of the machines that the attacker has knowledge
on that the current intent can be performed upon. Then lastly, certain parameters that are
not directly based off the knowledge are available to better control the running model it-
self. These are statistics like the attacker’s success/failure rate and the amount of times the
attacker could not choose an action (no attack action). This is primarily designed to control
the special stop kill chain stage which is used to terminate the current attack scenario. In
the case where the attacker fails too many times or the scenario diverges, the attack scenario
can be ended safely and predictably. This is the second instance where the model can be
ended other than from the intent being completed.
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3.3.5 Using Parameters To Choose Kill Chain Stage
This model relies heavily on the variability of the knowledge at any given point and the
knowledge is condensed down into the set of parameters seen previously in Figure 3.2.
These parameters are configured as a set of linguistic variables in the fuzzy logic controller
driving a set of rules defining the behaviors of the attacker in terms of a kill chain stage.
Fuzzy logic is well suited for applications where there is not a clear boolean decision pro-
cess for a situation and instead evaluating the membership of a function based on partial
truths. In this case fuzzy logic is used the address the uncertainties the attacker may have on
the rules defined. This represents the differences between attackers who may have a clear
direction with well defined rules for certain situations and attackers who may be unclear on
their next steps.
An example fuzzy rule set is defined in Figure 3.3 where a single rule is defined for each
of the kill chain stages in the MVKC. The detailed definition of the values and thresholds
for the linguistic variables for each of the parameters (as shown in Figure 3.1) is not shown
for simplicity of the example. Each of the linguistic variables has two possible states in
this example: high or low. The membership in these two states is defined by the attacker’s
behavior which is configured by the user of the model.
IF Scanned-Pinged Ratio is low OR Newly Compromised Machines is high THEN Kill Chain
Stage is RECON
IF Newly Scanned-Pinged Ratio is high AND Newly Compromised Machines is low THEN Kill
Chain Stage is BREACH
IF Machines With Intent is high THEN Kill Chain Stage is EXFILTRATION
Figure 3.3: Example fuzzy rule set for each of the kill chain stages in the MVKC
For each of these kill chain stages, the membership functions for each of the kill chain
stages must also be defined. In this example each of the kill chain stages are defined as
independent shown in Figure 3.4 where the x-axis represents the distribution for the stages
and the y-axis is the possible membership for each stage. The maximum membership
for the kill chain stages in the MVKC, recon, breach, and exfiltration, are at x={5,15,25}
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respectively.
Figure 3.4: The distribution of membership for each of the kill chain stages in the MVKC
As the attacker develops their knowledge base, the membership for each of these rules
will change as the values for the linguistic variables change. In the case where the attacker
knows nothing, where the rule defined denotes that the state is recon if the ratio or scanned
machines to pinged machines is low, which is the case with no knowledge, the stage is
recon. Each of the other rules will not be activated because no machines are scanned and
no machines are identified to contain the intent. This is shown in Figure 3.5 at x=5, where
recon is defined to be located, is at the maximum membership and all other states are zero.
Figure 3.5: The membership function of the kill chain stages when the attacker has no knowledge
on the network, choosing recon
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Once the attacker has performed some recon, the values for pinged and scanned ma-
chines will increase. Likewise because the attacker just performed these actions, this infor-
mation gain will be denoted as new information. This increases the values for the newly
scanned to pinged ratio parameter and the attacker has not compromised a machine re-
cently keeps that value low. This will produce full membership to the breach stage as seen
in Figure 3.6 at x=15 where again all other values are zero.
Figure 3.6: The membership function of the kill chain stages after the attacker has recent performed
recon scans, choosing breach
Once the attacker has chosen and performed breach, assume the attacker then performs
recon from the recently compromised target (which the rule for recon defines) and the at-
tacker finds their intent. In this case because of the “or” relationship and the decay function
of the newly compromised machine definition, there will still be some membership for re-
con. However the membership of the linguistic variable for machines with intent is set to
give full membership anytime that there is a single machine with the intent. This will make
the rule for exfiltration to overpower the rule for recon as seen in Figure 3.7.
The higher membership of exfiltration will lead to exfiltration to be chosen not because
the number is purely higher but because the kill chain stages with a higher x value is given
priority over stages at lower x values (right most maximum). This is exaggerated in Figure
3.8 where both the breach and exfiltration stages have full membership but the exfiltration
stage is chosen over the breach due to the right most maximum priority.
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Figure 3.7: The membership function of the kill chain stages after finding a machine with intent,
choosing exfiltration
Figure 3.8: The membership function of the kill chain stages after finding a machine with intent,
choosing exfiltration
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Fuzzy logic provides the platform to model the uncertainty that comes with certain
decision processes and is used here for the cases where many variables contribute to the
selection of a kill chain stage. The selection of the kill chain stages can be configured to be
well defined rules or fuzzy as shown above, adding to the flexibility of the model.
3.4 Modeling Attacker Skills and Preferences
The intent and opportunities parts of the ABM describe at a high level what the attacker is
going to do. Intent is the very high level goals of the attacker and where the opportunity is
with the intent what can be done. The initial intent starts with a large set of possible things
the attacker can do and the opportunity filters down that set by what is possible based off
of the knowledge of the attacker. The capabilities will further filter this down based off of
the skill of the attacker. After the COI is determined the result is a set of possible actions
based off the attacker intentions, knowledge, and skills. From this set the attacker must
choose their next action, which is where the preference of the attacker comes into play. As
mentioned previously, the attacker may have a similar COI but because of their personality
or other stimuli they may prefer to choose other targets or actions over another.
3.4.1 Capabilities: The Attacker’s Skill Set
The attacker’s skill can be difficult to define due to it being difficult to universally describe
what makes one attacker better than another. This is because what makes one attacker better
than another is purely situational. Two attackers with the same intentions may have very
different results in the same network because one may be better trained in web applications
where the other is more focused on database attacks for example. Debatably the overall
attacker skill based on the ability to adapt their skills using the intent with their knowledge
to work out an alternative solution. In this work, skill is defined by the attacker’s knowledge
of certain exploits to perform as the previous steps already factored in the intentions and
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knowledge into the decision making process. Defining attacker’s capabilities in terms of
the possible actions the attacker can perform provides the benefits of: easy to define, clear
meaning, and more inline real life situations (an attacker can only perform an attack they
know about). At the expense of flexibility (the attacker can not perform something that they
“kind of” know) and knowing whether or not the attacker actually can perform the attack
(we assume that if it is define, the attacker can perform it successfully).
By making these assumptions and defining the attacker’s skill in this way, this is now
defined as the capabilities of the attacker as opposed to the attacker’s skill. Previous works
would define skill as a numeric number [31] based off of metric describing the difficulty
of the attack. This sort of definition was scrapped due to no reliable data on what makes a
vulnerability more difficult to another. A numeric value describing the skill level is difficult
to understand the real world difference between two skill level values. Whereas by simpli-
fying the model and assuming that because the attacker has knowledge of the vulnerability,
the real world description of the attacker’s capabilities is much more meaningful and can
better describe the actions that they attacker’s would actually perform. This model is a
static description of the actions that the attacker can perform and does not account for any
sort of research an attacker would perform if they learned something about the network or
target in the middle of the simulation.
In this description of the ABM, the capabilities are factored in last due to it directly
relying on the outcome of the intent and opportunities. Note the usage of the word “last”
even though the preferences have not been factored in. This is because the preferences do
not effect the actual values of the possible actions that can be performed, only weighs them
according to the attacker’s preference to certain values. Reasoning for the order will be
discussed in the next section but the result will be the same but with a slightly different
meaning. The result of favoring in the capabilities is now the attacker is able to choose the
next action based off each of the factors and is the minimal set of actions at this point.
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3.4.2 Preferences: What the Attacker Chooses To Do Next
The final piece of the ABM, the attacker’s preference, is what each attacker from each
other and gives the variability in the simulation. Multiple attackers may have the same
COI but the actions that they choose and the targets that they choose can be very different
between one another. For example students that go through the same schooling with the
same intentions of getting a job out of school will may choose to apply to different types
of jobs and companies even though they very will could apply to the same. This is the
same here, the attackers may have the same intent and know the same sort of information
but the final details of the attack are up to the individual. The preferences plays a key
role in the ABM because as mentioned it is where most of the variability of the simulation
comes into play. All of the possible actions that could happen based off the COI has been
determined and the attacker could theoretically choose any of them at this point. With a
few key elements being weighed in to the possible actions from the COI, it is possible to
develop a set of actions with the probability of performing an action is scaled according to
the attacker’s preference within these elements.
First the variables on what variables can the attacker have a preference on must be de-
fined. By looking that the parameters needed to perform an attack it is possible to develop
a list of few variables in which an attacker can have a preference on. The most obvious pa-
rameter that the attacker has a preference on is the target machine. An attacker may choose
one target over another because of particular services or vulnerabilities for example. The
progression of the attacker and realism of the simulation relies on the preferences being
defined well. Thus the target preferences also needs to include factors like targeting a pre-
viously compromised target or targeting a machine where the attacker failed. This allows
the capability to tune the chances of an attacker targeting a machine they have already tar-
geted in different circumstances. Attackers may have their reasons to target machine they
previously targeted and this allows these machines to be favored or hindered. By taking
these into account, the user of the simulation can tune the ABM to allow certain types of
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behaviors in target decision if they choose.
With choosing the target the attacker must choose a machine to perform the attack from,
this is generally referred as the source of the attack. Source preferences is not nearly as crit-
ical as the target preferences, it does however add into the realism of the simulation. If the
source selection was completely unrestricted, the behavior that is seen is an attacker that is
jumping around using different sources which is a legitimate behavior but not desired for
every type of attack. Some attackers will compromise a target and then use that target as a
source, trying to penetrate the network as deep as possible. Thus there is a preference pa-
rameter to prefer that newly compromised machine as the attacker’s next source. Likewise,
if an attacker finds out that the source machine is a dead end (nothing connected to it) then
there is a parameter to prefer that machine as a possible source less then others if desired.
The last piece of the preferences is the attacker’s preference on which actions they
choose. The preference on actions can be based on the types of services they prefer, types of
reconnaissance they want to perform, or even actions that are less likely to be detected. This
is where the attacker’s “signature” can be modeled by the preference on certain actions.
Every attacker will have a different set of preferred actions which makes each attacker
unique from one another which could attribute how an attacker progresses through the
network. The action preference also includes favoring or hindering the chance of repeating
the same actions if performed previously or retrying the action after it previously failing.
These factors are included in this model because the attacker must respond to situations
that happened in previous cases like a failed attack or similar situation than before. Each
of these provides ample flexibility to describe attacker’s signatures and patterns based off
of their individual preferences and personality. The base set of preferences can be seen in
Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3: The base set of attacker preferences that can be modified by the user
Variable Description
Source Preferences Scales source probability on recently compromised targets
Persistence How persistent an attacker is after failing an attack (weighs target and action)
Compromised Target Likeihood to target a machine that has already been compromised.
Dead End Likelihood to use a dead end machine as a source.
Preferred Actions Scale certain actions by a preference weight
3.5 Combining Capabilities, Opportunity, Intent, and Preference Mod-
els
Each of these models in the ABM brings a critical aspect of the individual attacker. With
this proposed structure of description of a cyber attacker by defining the attackers COI+P,
the US criminal law definition of an adversary is satisfied with the COI along with describ-
ing the attacker’s personality with the +P. This gives a basis of what needs to be defined
to model a range of different cyber attackers. When combining these models to eventually
choose a single attack action the order in which these models are taken in consideration is
required to be evaluated. This means that the order in which the attacker’s capabilities, op-
portunity, intent, and preferences are factored into the model has different logical meaning
although should provide the same results in the end. In this situation, the preference of the
attacker will be considered last all of the time because only the COI actually modifies the
action sets.
Out of the six possibilities of the order of COI, the first of the models to be favored in
determines the overall meaning. For example if the capabilities of the attacker are addressed
first, this means that the attacker basing their attack based strictly their skills. The attacker
will filter out their possible actions based on if they think they can attack it in the first place.
This makes sense as an attacker will only choose their targets based on their skills they have
but not particularly at the beginning before they figure out if the network can perform it.
Where as if the opportunity is weighed in first in this model, the meaning is unclear because
the attacker does not have a clear goal to have an opportunity on. The opportunity model
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after all is the opportunity for the intent thus it is hard to place opportunity first since
it depends on the intent. Placing the intent first logically makes the most sense because
an attacker will always have some reason to begin an attack and then they can decide if
they have the opportunity to perform that intent and whether or not they have the skills to
perform that intent. This work chooses the order of intent, opportunities, capabilities, and
preferences due to logically the most clear however as shown later the design is not effected




The purpose of this work is to model the attacker’s behavior and thought processes in a
manner that better reflects real world attacks. Previous works to describe attacker’s behav-
iors uses purely probability based models or attack graph modeling that do not accurately
portray the styles and actions an attacker takes to penetrate and infiltrate a real network.
Instead of probabilistic models this design takes a information and knowledge based ap-
proach to deterministically model the attackers behaviors. Basing the attack action deci-
sions based on what the attacker knows about the network and its vulnerabilities along with
tune-able simulation parameters allows for a realistic simulation of various cyber attackers
in a network.
This version of the ABM takes a modular approach in the way it determines the next
action. In MASS [31], the ABM while it was a separate module from the rest of the simula-
tor, much of the logic to determine the next action was burdened onto the core logic of the
simulator making it very difficult to make changes. This design unloads the processing off
of the core logic of the simulator where the core logic will make a single call to the ABM
and it will return a single action as seen in Fig. 4.1. This is to allow many different types
of behavior models to be implemented later on, where the ABM can be seen as a black box
where the core logic does not depend on how the result of the ABM was achieved but the
contents of the result. In this design, the ABM will consist of many different internal mod-
ules which can be viewed as a state machine that will incrementally develop the solution in
41
various steps.
Figure 4.1: ABM basic black box design where the core logic only makes a single call to the ABM.
First to model the attacker behaviors, the thought process of an attacker must be broken
down into various steps or states to determine the next action the attacker is going to take.
To recap, four states are proposed to represent the attacker choosing an attack are: intent,
opportunities, capabilities, and preferences. Intent is what the attacker intends to do at any
given time. This can be seen as the attacker’s goal or in the case of the simulation intent
is the attack scenario that the user wants to simulate. The second state is opportunities
which is the attack set the attacker has based on the network knowledge and the intent they
have for the network. This based on what they know about the network and what they
want to accomplish is the total opportunity the attacker has on their network regardless of
their skill sets. However while the attacker may have an opportunity to attack a network,
they may or may not be capable of take advantage of those opportunities which is the
third state, capabilities. The attacker’s capabilities is seen as the attacker’s skill set or tool
chest. Each attacker is different and the type of exploits and vulnerabilities that they are
capable of using varies. Each of these three states are filters that will reduce the possible
attack set down to a set that represents the attacks the attacker is relevant to the goal of
the attacker, possible on the network that they are aware of, and the attacker is capable of.
Then the attacker must choose from this set which is the forth and final state, the attacker’s
preference. The attacker will choose the attack based on the types of attacks they prefer,
services they know, or other parameters to choose the attack.
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The goal of the ABM is to simply choose an attack action based off the intent, virtual
terrain, and knowledge of the attacker. Initially a set of possible actions governed by the
set up of the virtual terrain is compiled as the base set of actions. This is the set of all the
possible actions that could be performed given full knowledge of the network and before
any of the attacker’s knowledge is taken in account. As each step of the COI+P gets taken
in account, this set of actions will decrease in size to a point where all of the attacker’s
behaviors have been taken in account and an action can be chosen. This process can be
seen in Figure 4.2 depicting both the COI+P process flow and the decreasing action set
throughout the process.
Figure 4.2: Internal ABM states to determine the final attack action from the attacker’s intent,
opportunities, capabilities, and preferences.
These four states are the basic building blocks of the attacker’s thought process. How-
ever each of these stages focused on making decisions based on the knowledge the attacker
has on a network. Modeling the knowledge of the attacker is the fundamental basis for
this work and is what all the decisions regarding the attacker behavior is based off of. This
design focuses on the evolution of the attacker’s knowledge throughout the attack and how
each attacker chooses to use this knowledge to their advantage. By accurately modeling
the key aspects of what the attacker bases their decisions off of when attacking a network,
the types of behaviors that can be simulated can be simple or extremely complex.
4.1 General Process for Determining Attack Actions
Expanding on Figure 4.2, the actual process flow of the ABM can be created as seen in
Figure 4.3. The most significant contribution is the depiction of the instantiation of the
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attack action sets and the entry and exit points of the ABM. Each of the stages of the
COI+P is represented as a subprocess in this diagram. Each of the subprocesses will be
individually addressed in a separate section in this chapter. Each of the subprocesses will
It should be noted that by the time determine attack action is called the intent is already
realized and it is up to the ABM to determine the opportunity to achieve the intent. The
process flow at this stage of the ABM is straight forward, linear, and has few branches.
This is in part because of the design choices to break every piece of the design in their
own separate subprocesses to keep the complexity of the top level ABM down. This design
only has two ending conditions, which one returns a chosen attack action by the attacker
if all the steps of the COI+P was taken and the other is in the case where the simulation
has been reported as completed by the attacker. This allows for a predicable flow of the
program which makes it easier to add new features without changing the rest of the code
and simpler to understand the overall concept.
4.2 Attacker Knowledge Modeling
The knowledge the attacker has plays a critical role in all the decision processes of this
work and is the main contribution. This section will focus on the design of the attacker’s
knowledge and how it is developed. The knowledge is modeled a data structure containing
information about the network the attacker learns and in this design what is called the
“Attacker Knowledge Base” (AKB) which contains key information about the network
and is an evolving data structure as the attacker progresses throughout their attack. The
key design strategy with the AKB is to make it as expandable as possible as this design
provides a base for the knowledge as the ABM in the future advances the AKB can be
easily expanded. By implementing a single update function allows the possibility to expand
on different parts of the knowledge base like a plug-in, making it easy to implement new
features. The update methodology will be addressed in more detail later in this section.
The attacker knowledge is broken up into three parts as seen in Fig. 4.4. The overall
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Figure 4.3: The general process for the determine attack action method for the attacker behavior
model called by the simulation core logic.
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encompassing data structure is called Knowledge Base which contains many machine spe-
cific data structures called Machine Knowledge. Lastly is an enumerated type containing
the different fields that are contained in Machine Knowledge that can be updated. Each of
these different classes will be elaborated on further on later on in this section.
Figure 4.4: UML diagram describing the attacker’s knowledge design.
4.2.1 Knowledge Base
The Knowledge Base is a container of other network specific data structures that make up
the entire Attacker Knowledge. There is one Knowledge Base object for each behavior
model in which each of the other modules inside of the ABM have access to. The Knowl-
edge Base contains variables keeping track of the last source and target pair for quick
reference to keep track of where the attacker is in the network. This structure also con-
tains look-up tables for the potential sources and known machines to be used to quickly
reference IP Addresses of the machines that the attacker is aware of or have compromised.
These look-up tables tables store the hash of the IP addresses in a TreeSet for quick sorting
and searching though the list. Then the core of the knowledge base is the HashMap con-
taining the mapping between IP address hashes and their Machine Knowledge object. This
is the main data structure that represents the machine level knowledge the attacker has on
the machine.
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The knowledge base contains no methods that do any major calculations or processing
and only has methods that interface with the underlying data structures. To avoid compli-
cated data accessing all updating of the data structures are done through the update function
and all machine knowledge accesses are done though the knowledge base. The machine
knowledge updating process is encapsulated inside of the knowledge base to allow for a
expandable update function.
4.2.2 Machine Knowledge
The machine knowledge object is the basis of each decision that is made in the ABM.
The individual attributes that makes up the knowledge about specific machines provides
a foundation for the ABM to make decisions off of and is imperative to the accuracy and
flexibility of the model. The machine knowledge is represented as facts that the attacker
has observed one way or another, through previous knowledge or knowledge gained from
previous actions. While the information that they observed may or may not be correct
due to defenses or changes in configuration, this does not change the attacker’s decisions
because the attacker has not observed this change at the time.
The machine knowledge first starts off with the obvious parameter which is the observed
IP Address of the machine. The wording here using “observed” is chosen very specifically
to reflect that the IP address the attacker may observe could be different at any given time.
This is because the network may have a moving target defense (MTD) system implemented
in the network where the IP addresses, ports, and firewall permissions may change. The at-
tacker may not know that one of these systems are in place on the network and is only what
they know at the time the information was discovered. It was mentioned before that the in-
formation in the knowledge base, although facts, are only facts at the time the observation
was made and it is not guaranteed that it is correct. This is critical since all information is
based on what the attacker uncovered, attacks may become unsuccessful over time as their
knowledge becomes outdated. This methodology also applies to the observed state of the
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machine. As the network progresses in time, access vectors may no longer be available due
to some defense strategy implemented thus the observed state of the machine is no longer
consistent to the actual state of that machine on the network.
To keep track of where each machine can be accessed from, a list of possible sources
is maintained. When choosing an attack, the attacker will need to choose which machine
to attack but also what machine to attack from. Sources can either be just the internet, in
which it will be an external IP address, or a previously compromised machine. This pairing
is known as a source-target pair, in which will be passed to the core by the ABM as a part
of the overall attack action result. Likewise, a list containing the known open ports on
the machine is maintained. With each source-target pair, there is an associated port that is
being used to access the machine. As with the other parameters, these are observed at the
time the attacker has discovered the information and is subject to change at anytime. As
a source may or may not be accessible after a certain time or a port has opened or closed
without the attacker knowing.
The modeling of vulnerabilities in this design is based on MITRE’s Common Vulnera-
bilities and Exposures (CVE) which a single CVE represents a vulnerability on a particular
service. The network is described as a collection of machines with services and each of
these services has their own set of CVE’s. Knowing the type of services and how they
are accessed, including the operating system, potentially gives the attacker options on the
types of vulnerabilities that can be used on the machine. The machine knowledge object
keeps track of the list of services known on a machine along with a mapping to service to
open ports. The list of just services is used as a look up table to quickly search, sort, and
union/intersect with other lists. The mapping structure is for after the source/target pair
is chosen and the vulnerability to be used to then pick the port used for that vulnerability.
Lastly, the vulnerabilities that was used on the machine is also kept track of. This is to
represent persistence threats and a record of attacks that were previously used against that
target. Generally if the target was vulnerable to an attack once, it can be used against them
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again unless the target is updated. All of the available variables that represent the attacker’s
knowledge for one machine can be seen in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: List of variables that represents one instance of the attacker’s machine knowledge
Variable Description Type
Observed IP The observed IP of the machine int
Observed State State the attacker observes the machine as NodeState
Accessible By Sources that can access this machine Set<Int>
Open Ports The open ports on this machine List<Long>
Known Services The services known by the attacker Set<Int>
Service To Port Mapping between service and open port Map<Int,Set<Long>>
Known Vulnerabilities Known vulnerabilities on each service. Map<Int,Set<Int>>
isDeadEnd If this machine can be used as a source boolean
Attempted Exploits The attempted exploits by the attacker Set<Int>
4.2.3 Attack Records
Along with the network knowledge, the attacker also can use information about their previ-
ous attacks to make decisions. This is known as the attack records in the ABM. These are
general statistics about the different attacks that the attacker has performed in a much more
general sense. The network knowledge was more about information that the attacker learns
about the network where the records is stats about the attacks themselves, like success rate
of the attacker or the result of the last action for example. Statistics like the total failed
compromising actions, or total successful compromising action can be useful for control-
ling when the attacker completes their attack scenario or to tell the simulation to end. The
records is also useful for general statistic tracking as results because the records also keeps
track of when certain machines were discovered, scanned, and compromised. The list of
variables being tracked in the records can be seen in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: The list of variables being tracked by the simulator as statistics of the attacker’s actions.
Variable Description Type
Current Step Current step of the attacker int
Last Target Last target of the attacker int
Last Action Last action used by the attacker int
Last Result Result type of the last action ActionType
Total Actions Performed Number of actions performed int
Successful Actions Total successful actions int
Recon Actions Number of recon actions performed int
Successful Recon Actions Total successful recon type actions int
Compromising Actions Number of compromising actions performed int
Successful Comp. Act. Total successful compromising actions int
Step When Discovered Step at which each machine was discovered Map<int,List<int>>
Step When Scanned Step at which each machine was scanned Map<int,List<int>>
Step When Compromised Step at which each machine was compromised Map<int,List<int>>
No Attack Count Count of NO ATTACK attack types int
4.2.4 Updating the Knowledge Base
With the stream of information incoming from the attack, an efficient and scaleable knowl-
edge base update function is needed. By centralizing the update function within the knowl-
edge base, this minimizes the work needed to add in new fields if and when the ABM
Knowledge module is changed. However centralization is not enough to enforce easy scal-
ability. By using an enumerated type that labels the update data, the update function can
determine how to manipulate the data to update the knowledge and enforce strict type cast-
ing. The knowledge fields enumerated type can be seen in Fig. 4.5 showing the base set of
modify-able fields
Figure 4.5: UML diagram describing the Knowledge Fields enumerated type.
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In the update function within the knowledge base, the input to the function is a HashMap
where the key is a KnowledgeFields enum and a value of object. As mentioned before the
purpose of the knowledge field enum is to dictate what to cast the value object into. This
is to allow the capability to perform bulk updates to the knowledge base since the hash
map can take many different key value pairs. This update function also will report whether
or not the update changed any values within the knowledge base. This is to inform the
ABM that no new knowledge was uncovered in the last action. This could be useful in a
case that a scan was performed on the same subnet from two different sources yielding no
information gain.
4.3 Initialization of the Attack Action Sets
The flowchart of the ABM shown in Figure 4.3, the first subprocess that is addressed is the
generation of the attack action sets. The attack action set is a data structure that contains
not only the actions that can be performed by the attacker but also the possible source and
targets for those actions. This creates a mapping between sources and targets and also a
mapping between target and action. This data structure forms the bases for each of the
COI+P functions in the ABM as each of these will take in the action set and filter it down
by their criteria. The initialization of the attack action set requires the use of the virtual
terrain and is the only time an ABM function interacts with another context model directly.
This is due to the attack action set is initialized to the perfect knowledge of the network
first and then the COI+P models will modify it and filter it.
The initialize function requires some sort of awareness of the knowledge of the attacker
purely for efficiency purposes. For example, if the action sets indeed did start with full
knowledge of the network in a large network, the action set would be extremely large be-
cause it would have to have effectively copy the virtual terrain each instance of determine
attack action. To combat this issue, the action sets are initialized to only include the ma-
chines that the attacker is aware of. If the attacker is not aware of any machines then the
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action set will only include the reconnaissance actions since they are the only actions that
are possible to perform at this stage. A known limitation of this model is that it does not
allow the capability of trying attacks on IP’s that do not exist, as some may try on random
subnets. Once the possible targets are initialized, the sources can be any machine the cur-
rent “targets” have access to which is accessible from the virtual terrain. Then lastly the
actions for each of the possible targets are initialized to all the possible vulnerabilities on
that potential target given the services on the virtual terrain. This then can be passed though
the rest of the ABM to eventually pick a source-target-action grouping to make up a single
action.
4.4 Intent and Opportunities
There are two different meanings for intent in this context. First is the intent of the attacker
which is the goal of the attacker at that stage of the attack and the second type of intent is
the goal of user of this model. This framework is designed for simulation and in the end is
going to be used to produce simulated attack scenarios, thus the user of the simulator must
be kept in mind. In MASS, the previous notion of intent was given by the Scenario Guid-
ance Template (SGT) where the simulation was controlled by a state machine depending on
the actions performed. This was further expanded on with the Attack Guidance Template
(AGT) which supplied a set of attack actions to the ABM determined by simulation goals
to influence the attacker’s actions.
This notion of guidance is preserved in this work. Where the intent is what the goal
of the simulation is and the opportunities is how the attacker, based on their knowledge,
can perform that intent. However this is slightly different that what is mentioned before
where the AGT and ABM are two separate entities. The AGT represented strictly the goal
of the simulation and the ABM in MASS was a separate entity uninfluenced by the AGT
requirements. Whereas in this work it is more seen as the intent is the goal of the simulation
and of the attacker, it is how the individual attackers reach the opportunity to perform the
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intent that is different. The intent is given as input by another function (in this case the
intent module) and the ABM uses that information to filter down the attack set by their
knowledge. How the attack set is filtered down is based on not only the intent but the
knowledge, the Cyber Attack Kill Chain methodology is used here as the basis of attack
stages.
4.4.1 Cyber Attack Kill Chain
The cyber attack kill chain is used by many different organizations to describe the various
stages and order that an attacker takes to infiltrate and attack a network. While some have 5
stages and others have 10+, there is a common set of stages regardless of the type of attack
(Denial of Service, Phishing, Mobile, etc.). These stages were identified as the MVKC
(Minimum Viable Kill Chain): Reconnaissance, Breach, and Exfiltration. The recon stage
is the data collection stage, learning about the network and building the attacker’s knowl-
edge base. The breach stage is when the attacker does not have their objective immediately
“in-sight” and attacks a machine to progress into the network. Lastly exfiltration is per-
forming some attack as part of the intent to either take down a machine, steal information,
etc. These three stages are identified as the three minimum stages to perform an attack how-
ever in this design a forth special stage is implemented known as the Stop stage. This is to
signify to the simulator that the attacker has completed their attack because they achieved
their goal or they are giving up for some reason. The details of the stages are given in a
later section.
Following the same style as the rest of the design, although three stages are identified
as a minimum here, the stages are modular and extra stages can be added. As seen in
Figure 4.6, the individual stages inherit from the abstract parent class KillChainStage and
must implement the filterByIntent() method. Each of the kill chain stages are following a
singleton pattern, making only one of each stages to be created at a time. This is due to
when the kill chain stage is chosen, the method returns a kill chain stage object and only
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the filter method is used and does not store information.
Figure 4.6: UML diagram showing the three different stages
The ABM does not need to know specifically which stage it has chosen, it only needs to
call the filter function to reduce down the attack set. To add in another stage only the filter
method needs to implemented and the method that chooses the kill chain stage needs to
be changed. Before choosing an stage, a brief understanding of differences between each
stage is needed.
Reconnaissance KC Stage
The recon stage focuses mostly on gaining knowledge using the recon techniques described
above, social engineering, or phishing (if implemented). The recon stage filter set does
not contain any attacks that would be considered malicious and purely knowledge gain
based. The purpose of the recon stage is for the attacker to learn more about the network
and how the knowledge gained can be used against the network. If the attacker does not
have enough information about the network to perform their intent, then the attacker must
perform reconnaissance on the network. Not enough information could be not knowing IP
addresses, the machine’s services, or the attacker is searching for key information about
the network before they choose to attack the network. If this stage is chosen, the filter will
remove any attack actions that are not of recon type from the resultant attack set.
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Breach KC Stage
The breach stage is defined as the set of attacks the attacker may perform that does have
malicious intent, but does not pertain to the specific goal of the attacker/simulation. In this
case, the attacker has determined that there is enough knowledge about the network that
they can move to the next stage. The overall goal of the breach stage is to compromise a
machine with the intent of using it as a possible source to eventually reveal the knowledge
to achieve their final goal. This is a critical stage for multi-stage attacks as most high-profile
targets will be more than one layer deep within the protection of the network. This is also
useful for advanced attacks that require prior authentication to the target machine before
using another vulnerability to complete their goal later in the exfiltration stage. The filter in
this stage is less aggressive and will filter out any attack actions that are not of recon type
and not pertaining to the final goal of the attacker.
Exfiltration KC Stage
The exfiltration stage is extremely similar to the breach stage however instead of choosing
any attack, only the attack actions pertaining to the goal of the attack is chosen. The
reason for the difference between the breach and exfiltration stage is to specifically favor
the actions that directly pertain to the goal. The separate intent module is monitoring
whether or not this state is selected and the outcome of the selected action. If the action is
successful, the intent module will update and return the next intent if it is available. In the
cases where the intent module does not return a new intent, the attacker has then completed
their intent successfully and the simulation is completed for that attacker.
Stop KC Stage
This kill chain stage is a special stage used primarily to signify the point at which the
attacker should stop the attack track. If at any point in the simulation the stop state is
chosen by the kill chain selection logic, the logic immediately will branch away from the
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normal logic (capabilities and preferences) and trigger the core logic to end the attack track.
The stop stage can be triggered by both simulation parameters and if the intent module
has signified that the attack scenario is completed. This allows the both the simulator to
control the when the attacker has accomplished the goal of the attack scenario and allows
the behaviors of the attackers to determine the end of the attack based on what is learned
through out the simulations. The filter in this stage returns nothing as it is not being used
for any calculations.
4.4.2 Choosing Kill Chain Stage Using Knowledge: Implementation
Choosing the kill chain stage is a primary function of this work, as it represents the types
of attacks based on the intent that the attacker has and the knowledge gained throughout
the simulation. How these stages are chosen is critical to accurate simulations of attacker
behaviors. Also to create many different types of behaviors, the design and configuration
must be flexible to not restrict the types of behaviors that can be modeled. To recap, the
kill chain stage is chosen using fuzzy logic where a user can set thresholds and rules on
a given set of variables from the simulator to describe various different types of attackers.
The fuzzy logic in this ABM uses the JFuzzyLogic [6] which is the standard package for
implementing fuzzy logic control in Java. This takes in a “FCL” file which is a configura-
tion file that contains all of the variable definitions, linguistic variables, state distributions,
and rule functions. An example of the a FCL file for the ABM can be seen in Figure 4.7.
Using JFuzzyLogic simplifies the kill chain selection process significantly because the
simulation variables described in the previous chapter simply needs to be inputted in to the
fuzzy controller and call the evaluate function. Calling the evaluate function takes all the
user input for the attacker’s behavior and chooses a state. Some key design choices and
assumptions do need to be taken into account however to ensure that there is predictable
results from the fuzzy logic controller. The first assumption is that every kill chain stage
is independent from one another, meaning that kill chain stages do not have any actions in
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Figure 4.7: An example of a FCL file for JFuzzyLogic for the ABM.
common. This is the case for the MVKC as each of the states filter out each other when
chosen, however if the stages have actions in common then it must be reflected in the fuzzy
logic. An example on the fuzzy logic with independent states are shown in Figure 4.8.
Note the minimal overlap between the four distributions that represent the states, this is
to say that there is nothing in common between these states. If there was a case where there
were many possible actions that were shared between two stages, then the distributions for
those stages should have overlap reflecting the amount of actions shared between them.
This ambiguity allows for the behaviors and the rules to drive the decision between the
two states which could provide interesting results when comparing attackers in the same
situation. The next assumption is that the states shown in Figure 4.8 are ordered from left
to right in least to most critical states. While the ABM does not directly preserve order in
the kill chain, to aid in the realism some priority is given to more important states. This
is known the JFuzzyLogic as “Right Most Maximum” where the state with the highest
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Figure 4.8: An example of the state definition in the fuzzy logic representing independent states.
membership to the farthest right on the state list will have priority. The example usage here
is that the minute that the stop stage over powers the rest of the stages, it should absolutely
stop the attack because clearly something has happened that requires the attacker to stop.
This is just an example as the priority of the stop stage can be lowered to favor other stages
until it does not make nothing else can be done.
Reflecting upon the parameters described for the kill chain logic in the previous chapter,
the definition of most of the variables are self explanatory and straight forward. Mentioned
before, there is a notion “new knowledge” and what is described as new knowledge. This
functionality of new knowledge gives the user to prioritize newly obtained knowledge to
determine the next kill chain stage. First intuition is to describe a knowledge range which
is how far back (in attack steps/actions) does the attacker consider the information as new.
This could pose an issue because saying the “information from now and three steps ago
is new” is very rigid because it gives very little flexibility in the fuzzy logic control in the
thresholding because of the discrete values. For example if an attacker found 15 machines
on step 1 and compromised one machine on step 2 with the knowledge range being three
steps, even if the intentions of the user configuration was to compromise one machine out
of the 15 and then use that as the next source the chances of that happening is very low
because the 15 machines will overpower the next rule. This is an extreme case for one
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situation that may actually be desired but the issue is that newer information may want to
be favored over older information.
The proposed solution to this issue is to weigh older information less than newer infor-
mation if desired. This functionality is defined as the knowledge decay function. Contained
in the attack records is the collection of “Step When” functions which returns the count of
actions given a range and the current step. For the example above, this function would re-
turn 15 for newly scanned machines and 1 for newly compromised for a knowledge range
of 2. The decay function will take some decay variable (0-1) set by the user and raise it to
the current step minus the step at which the action took place multiplied by the number of
actions as seen in (4.1).
yweighted = decay
scurrent−si ∗ actionCount (4.1)
4.5 Attacker Capabilities
The capabilities stage of the ABM describes the skill set of the attacker. While the intent
and opportunities stage described at a high level what the attacker would like to accom-
plish and the opportunities they have knowing what they know to accomplish that intent,
the capabilities is the skills the attacker has to take advantage of the opportunities. For
example, at any given moment a machine has vulnerabilities and there is an opportunity to
compromise the machine with the intent of stealing information. If this person attacking
the machine is a skilled and experienced hacker, they may be capable to successfully use
this opportunity with their skill sets to compromise the target. On the other hand if the at-
tacker is a script kiddie and automates their attacks, they may not be capable of performing
the specific vulnerability needed to take advantage of their opportunity.
The attacker capabilities describes the difference between the skill sets of the attacker
because after all if an attacker does not have the skill to perform an attack, it does not matter
whether they know about the vulnerability or not. Likewise an attacker that is not aware
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of a vulnerability’s existence generally will not be capable of performing that attack either,
unless they learn about the vulnerability durning the attack in which is not modeled. The
capabilities list is a static list describing either a whitelist of the skills they do have or a
blacklist of the specific skills they don’t have. The whitelist is more difficult to define but
more accurate to describing the skills of the attacker. Whereas the blacklist makes it easier
to leave the skill set of the attacker more open ended for greater variety in attack sets. Fig.
4.9 shows the basic structure of the attacker capabilities and the functions with in it.
Figure 4.9: UML diagram describing the attacker’s capabilities design.
The capabilities object stores two representations of the attack set. First is the array list
containing the actual query to the vulnerability database which is what is inputted as a part
of the ABM input files. This will be used once to pull the action sets from the database
by the method generateCapabilitiesSet() and will insert it into the capabilities set. The
important fact to note is that if the set is declared as a whitelist or a blacklist, the query to
the database will be the same. The blacklist will not pull every attack action that is not apart
of the list because that is potentially a large list. If the set is a blacklist when performing the
filter, the input set will have the blacklist’s entries removed. Whereas in the whitelist, the
input set will be intersected with the whitelist. This will keep the sizes of the sets smaller
and make it easier to perform calculations upon.
4.6 Attacker Preferences
Once all of the filtration of the attack action sets are complete, the preference model can
then determine the probability to choose a source, target, and action independently. Along
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with the attack action sets a mirrored version of the action sets is created but instead of
the actual source, target, and action data the probabilities of choosing these parameters is
created. Where the index for a specific source given a target in the attack action sets will
directly correspond to its probability value in the mirrored probability sets. For each target
there is a set of possible sources and each of those sources have a probability of choosing
that source given a target. Likewise for each target there is a set of actions in which each
action has a probability value of choosing the action given a target. This does create du-
plicate source and action values for a given target however this allows the capability for
specific sources or actions to be weighed differently for different targets. Where as if there
was only one list of source probabilities for all targets it would be difficult to keep track of
what source belongs to what target and there may be a case where a source is eliminated
for one target and not the other.
The probabilities of the attack action set are initially set uniformly as every target is
equally likely to be chosen and every source and action given a target is equally likely to
be chosen. For this preference model will directly modify the probability sets based of the
user configured values for each of the preference parameters shown in the previous chapter.
To model the preference of the source, target, or action a weighting scheme is employed
to amplify certain values over an other. For example, if the attacker is defined to have a
preference on mySQL actions the user can configure the preferences parameter to make
those actions 10x more likely to happen than other actions. This action set can then be
normalized and the multiplayer would still be preserved. The probability values will be
modified by multiple different functions but because the only operation that is done to the
probabilities is multiplication, order does not matter in this case.
4.6.1 Variably Weighted Preferences Values
The previous example only showed a static value as the weight to a probability where there
are cases where the weights should change depending on some circumstances. Similarly
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to the “new” knowledge concept of the kill chain logic, the attacker may have a preference
on the source or target depending on the time at which it was uncovered. While in the
kill chain the weight was only an inverse power function, the preference allows for four
different functions based off of time to scale the preferences by. These four functions can
be seen in Table 4.3 where α is the user set function modifier and t is the difference between
current attack step and the step at which the information was collected.














The purpose of these is to allow the capability of certain functions to be able to weigh
the probability of sources or targets depending on time. For example, in the case where
the attacker has a preference of aggressively favoring targets that are the newest then they
would choose a high α with the exponential function active. This makes it possible to favor
the newest information and older information will be exponentially less favored. Where on
the other side of the spectrum, the constant value will only scale the applicable values by
the constant α and not take time into account. The α values are intended to be greater than
or equal to 1 to give the highest priority to newer information as opposed to higher priority
to older information, however this is not a restriction and a user could set the value to less
than 1 if that is desired.
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4.6.2 Preference Parameters To Determine Weights
This variable weighting method is only used for the source preferences, target preferences,
and dead end preference. This is because this information is based off of time, where the
action preferences are not. The source probabilities takes in account all the machines that
are known to be compromised and determines how likely an attacker is going to use that
machine as their next source. Whereas the target preferences is how likely an attacker is
going to target a machine that has already been compromised. This is to prevent the attacker
repeatedly targeting machines that they have already compromised which would gain them
no new information in most cases, however in the case of a moving target defense that may
not be the case. This is also the case for the dead end machines where a scan was performed
and nothing was seen. In the case of a MTD and the attacker is aware of that, the attacker
may want to revisit that machine at some point but for the most part the attacker would not
favor using a dead end machine as a source again.
Persistence and preferred actions are the situations where there is no configurable func-
tions available to the user. Instead for the persistence the attacker configures the mean and
the standard deviation of the number of attempts the attacker will make to try a failed attack
again. A random number is generated based off the normal distribution set and if the num-
ber of steps is less than the random number, the attack will be repeated. This means that if
the attacker is going to be persistent, all the target probabilities that was not the last target
will be zeroed out. This is also applied for the action also, the attacker can be persistent
on the target and/or the action. An attacker may choose to try another vulnerability on the
same target that they just failed on in which the last vulnerability performed is zeroed out.
Preferred actions preference is the simplest of the preference modifiers because the user
assigns a static weight to actions and it is applied to the action sets. This can be used to
favor or deter the attacker from performing certain actions or preferring a specific type of
reconnaissance. The compiled list of modifiable fields of the preference model can be seen
in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.4: The user configurable variables that are used to control the attacker’s preferences.
Variable Configurable Variables
Source Preferences α, Weighting Function
Persistence α,σ
Compromised Target α, Weighting Function
Dead End α, Weighting Function
Preferred Actions Map<Action, Weight>
4.7 Choosing an Attack Action
Once the probabilities have been fully modified by the preferences, the action selection
process can be started. First the attack action sets must be reduced down into a single
array. To start, all source, target, and action sets are normalized after the preferences are
complete. For each target there is a corresponding target to source set/probabilities and
a target to action set/probabilities. For a given target if there is 3 possible sources and
5 possible actions, this will result in 15 individual source-target-action grouping with 15
corresponding probabilities for one target. To combine the individual probabilities of the
sources, targets, and actions, the values are simply multiplied together to yield one value.
This is possible because each of the source and action probabilities only rely on a single
target and are normalized with in and each of the target probabilities are normalized with
each other. This will yield two lists one for the source-target-action values and another
for the probabilities each of size total sources multiplied by the size of the total number of
targets and the total number of actions left after the filtration.
Given the single probabilities set, a cumulative set of probabilities is generated based
of this set. At this point the set is normalized and cumulative thus to pick an action a single
random number is generated between 0 and 1. A binary search to find what index in the
cumulative set does this random number fall in which directly corresponds to the chosen
action in the source-target-action group set. This source-target-action grouping is then
organized into the attack action data structure which will be used by the simulation core
to process the attacker’s selection. This contains IP addresses, CVE data, and if needed
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any parameters needed to simulate the attack like in reconnaissance actions. This action is
returned to the core and the ABM process is completed.
4.7.1 No Actions To Select
Throughout the filtration process there may be cases where there is no attacks to choose
from. What this generally means is that based off the COI, there was no actions that the
attacker could perform. This can be due to the attacker not having the capabilities to per-
form any attacks based off the service knowledge they have or they have exhausted all of
their options. This is known as a “NO ATTACK” type in the simulation. This is a case
that must be handled by the fuzzy logic and the attacker must react to this situation either
by stopping the simulation or attempting to learn more information. Regardless it is worth
addressing that there will possibly be cases where the attacker simply cannot progress due
to their knowledge of the network.
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Chapter 5
Experiments and Results Analysis
Co-developed with this ABM, a simulator called the Cyber Attack Scenario and Network
Defense Simulator (CASCADES) will be used to analyze the output of the ABM. CAS-
CADES’s only objective in this work is to take an attack action from the ABM and compile
the effects of this action on the network. None of attack action selection logic is located
anywhere within the core CASCADES logic and the statistics generated in this chapter are
derived from the attacker’s perspective only. Four different types of attackers will be ad-
dressed in this work: an expert, an amateur, an exhaustive, and random attackers. For each
of these types of attackers, their performance will be evaluated on the success rate, number
of actions performed, the types of attacks performed, and the types of services exploited by
the attacker for two different types of networks. Then lastly, a single attack track will be
analyzed to show the results of a single attack scenario in a granular fashion.
5.1 CASCADES Setup
CASCADES is versatile cyber attack simulation platform with may features that are not
used in this work. The ABM is a completely separate function to the CASCADES logic and
the only functions used by the core logic is the determine next attack action and the update
functions. The ABM resides in what is called the Attack Track in CASCADES which
represents a single attacker with a single intent. The overall architecture for CASCADES
can be seen in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Architecture overview of the CASCADES simulator.
The parts of CASCADES that will be used is the ABM, Intent, Virtual Terrain, and
the Vulnerability Database. A moving target defense (MTD) will not be used as it has not
been adapted from MASS to CASCADES. All intrusion detection systems and sensor noise
simulations are deemed to be irrelevant to this work as only the ground truth actions are
to be taken in account. For each experiment, 1000 simulations will be run with the same
ABM and intent to generate an average behavior metric.
5.1.1 Virtual Terrain Setup
The configuration of the network, or in this case the virtual terrain, is critical to the process
of testing the ABM. If the network is too small then there may be little variance in the
results due to the low amount of options. The network being too large is not as much as a
concern as this will amplify some of the differences between the attackers. However testing
the patience and overall persistence of the attacker is not being tested where instead a few
key design choices to test certain aspects of the attacker’s behavior. The virtual terrain that
is in use in this work is seen in Figure 5.2 which describes 15 individual machines each
with their own special characteristics.
Although this network is relatively small (in terms of number of machines) compared to
enterprise networks and even a small business network, it has key design aspects that gives
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Figure 5.2: Visual representation showing the connections and machines in the virtual terrain being
used.
it realistic and diverse results. First is the modeling of the separation of a guest network
and the internal network. It is typical for a network to have one subnet that has internet
connectivity but not access to the rest of the internal network like a guest network would
have. This is to test the case where the attacker gains access to this machine and there is
nothing else to do because the permissions are very limited. This network also is configured
with firewalls in mind. A typical network will have a tiered permission set up where only
specific machines can access other machines due to permissions. If a machine does not the
correct permissions then the machine cannot access or even acknowledge that a machine
exists. This allows for the ability to simulate multistage attacks where an attacker must
gain access to other machines before progressing. The list of machines and permissions
between each of these machines can be see in Table 5.1. The ID’s in this table directly
correspond to the labels on the machine icons in Figure 5.2.
Note the names of each of the machines in this description of the VT. Each machine and
it’s location in the network has some sort of relevance to represent the types of machines
on a typical network. On level 1, which are all of the machines that are accessible from the
external network, are all machines that typically will be exposed like a mail server or a web
server. Whereas level 2 contains the machines that have more permissions to the network
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Table 5.1: List of the machines on the virtual terrain and their access permissions.
Machine Info Permissions
ID Name I L1 L2 L3
1 External Router X
2 Guest Wireless Router X
3 Level 2 Router X X X
4 Level 3 Router X X
11 Guest Windows 8 X
12 External Web Server X X
13 External DNS Server X X
14 External Mail Server X X
15 External Web App Server X X
100 Developer Machine (Unix) X X X
101 Developer Machine (Mac) X X X
102 Administrator (Windows) X X X X
103 OES Print Server X X
104 OpenLDAP Server X X X
1000 VMWare ESXi X X
1001 NAS X X
1002 Backup Server X
1003 Development GitLab X X
1004 MySQL Customer Info X X
like developer machines, the domain server, and a print server. Then on the bottom end are
all the internal services and critical machines like the storage systems, backup servers, and
virtual machine servers. This gives a more realistic setup for a network that although not
as large as a typical network but has all of the key characteristics of a real network.
Likewise the permissions between machine or the firewall was configured in a certain
way to test how the attacker responds given certain situations. Already mentioned, the
dedicated guest network with many vulnerabilities is set up on purpose to test the attacker’s
response when there is nothing to learn from that machine. That machine is also chosen
to have many vulnerabilities to possibly make it more appealing to some attackers than
others. The concept of an administrative machine is also shown here which has access to
every machine on the network which may provide interesting results as if that machine
is compromised, the entire network can be accessed. Then lastly the backup sever can
only be accessed by the level 3 machines and the administrator which effectively creates a
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fourth level. With all these design elements taken in consideration, this provides the base
opportunities for the attacker to perform their attack scenario.
A perfectly configured and managed network should contain the least amount of entry
points and vulnerabilities, this however is not usually the case. It can be difficult to maxi-
mize the resilience of a network to a cyber attacker and misconfigurations or certain aspects
of the network can be overlooked. To examine the effects of a misconfigured network, an
intentional backdoor into the protected section network is inserted into the network. As an
example, a developer wants to access the development GitLab server from outside of the
network. Instead of using a VPN or some other method of accessing it safely, instead the
developer exposed the server to the external network by changing the firewall permissions.
This allows this machine to be directly accessible from the internet, bypassing the other
layers of security into the network. These modifications can be seen in bold in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: The modified VT permissions with the misconfigurations in bold.
Machine Info Permissions
ID Name I L1 L2 L3
1 External Router X
2 Guest Wireless Router X
3 Level 2 Router X X X
4 Level 3 Router X X X
11 Guest Windows 8 X
12 External Web Server X X
13 External DNS Server X X
14 External Mail Server X X
15 External Web App Server X X
100 Developer Machine (Unix) X X X
101 Developer Machine (Mac) X X X
102 Administrator (Windows) X X X X
103 OES Print Server X X
104 OpenLDAP Server X X X
1000 VMWare ESXi X X
1001 NAS X X
1002 Backup Server X
1003 Development GitLab X X X
1004 MySQL Customer Info X X
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5.1.2 Attacker’s Intent
In CASCADES, the intent of the attacker is a separate model defined outside of the attacker
behavior model. Based on the output of the attack action being performed, the intent mod-
ule will return the attacker’s next intent or goal. In the ABM, the intent is only taken into
account if and only if the attacker has some knowledge to perform the intent (the exfiltra-
tion kill chain stage). Because of this, between all of the experiments the intent will remain
unchanged between runs however chosen to be sufficiently difficult enough to challenge
each of the attackers. In this case, the intent of the attackers will be focused on the backup
server in the third level of the network. This is done because the backup server has the most
restrictive of access permissions as only the level 3 machines and the administrative have
access to the machine.
5.1.3 Attacker Behavior Configurations
This thesis addresses four different types of attackers: the expert, the amateur, the exhaus-
tive, and the random attacker. Both the expert and the amateur designed to measure the
differences between capabilities of attackers while the comprehensive and random attack-
ers are for measuring the general resilience to a brute force attack. Each of these attackers
have interesting characteristics that makes them different from one another, showing a wide
variety of behaviors that can be modeled with this work.
Amateur vs. Expert Behavior
The amateur behavior in this context is someone who has a limited skill set and does
not have a general direction throughout the attack. Where as the expert attacker comes
preloaded with some information about the types of services on the network already along
with a much larger skill set than the attacker. The amateur attacker performs thorough re-
connaissance scans which to a novice attacker provides the most information back but is
also the most revealing and loudest from a IDS or defense perspective. Then once there
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are known machines and services by the amateur attacker, this is when the breach stage
will be chosen. The amateur attacker will be limited on the machines they can choose after
this stage because their capabilities are limited to a few select services. Contrasting to the
expert who is methodical about the amount of reconnaissance and breaches they perform.
The expert attacker is chosen to be balanced on the amount of recon versus the amount
of attacking they perform, only gaining enough information without drawing attention to
themselves. A summary of the two different behaviors can be seen in Table 5.3.
The preferences between the two attackers also varies greatly. The preferences on the
source machine are similar but the expert is more aggressive in using the last compromised
machine as a source. This is the difference between using the exponential functions vs. the
inverse or linear functions in the setup of the preference values. The exponential function
of the expert attacker favors recently compromised targets much more aggressively than the
linear function of the amateur. However, if the expert identifies the compromised target as
a dead end (no new information can be learned from using it) then it will never choose that
as a source again. Whereas the amateur attacker does not really recognize that it is a dead
end and may try using it as a source again. As for the target machine preferences, the ama-
teur behavior chooses anything that it knows about but slightly favoring newly discovered
machines. The expert is much more aggressive in the target selection and favors targets
that are uncompromised and recently discovered. Lastly, the preference on actions is what
greatly differs these two attackers from one another. The amateur attacker has no prefer-
ence on the types of actions but the expert attacker has preferences based on preexisting
knowledge of the network. The expert is setup to acknowledge that this is a development
company and certain common services on the protected section of the network is given
preference like SQL, python, java, etc. This gives the attacker an advantage because they
have an idea of what they are looking for. These differences in preferences can be seen in
Table 5.4.
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Table 5.3: ABM configuration summaries for each attacker.
Amateur Expert Comprehensive Random
Capabilities Limited All All All
Recon Stage Exhaustive Balanced Exhaustive Random
Breach Stage Scanned Any Machine Balanced Found Machines Random
Exfil. Stage Intent Intent 90% Machines Compromised Random
Stop Stage 5 Failures 5 Failures Exhausted Known Options 5 Failures
Comprehensive and Random Behaviors
The comprehensive and random behaviors are much simpler nature because they are not
necessarily representative of real behaviors. The comprehensive is the brute force, DoS-
like behavior with the intentions of doing as much damage as possible. Where the random
behavior is the base line of what could happen to a network if an attacker tried anything
with no direction. The key characteristic of the comprehensive attacker is that it will ex-
haustively attack the network until it has 90% of the machines compromised one way or
another. This is done by controlling the kill chain stages by determining how many ma-
chines are uncompromised compared to how many are known. Where the random will try
anything at any time regardless of if it was done before. The summary of these behaviors
can be seen in Table 5.3.
The preferences of these two behaviors are the the same story. In this case for the
Random attacker, there are no preferences at all on anything. For each of the preference
parameters the constant function modifier is used with a value of one, not affecting the
probabilities of any actions at all. The comprehensive attacker will only target machines
that they have not compromised yet and favor sources more recently found. The only
preference on actions that the comprehensive attacker will have is on thorough recon scans
because they are concerned about getting the most information and are unconcerned with
how covert they are being. These differences can be seen in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4: ABM preference summary for each of the attackers.
Amateur Expert Comprehensive Random
Source Recently Compromised Last Compromised Recently Compromised None
Target Anything Known Uncompromised only Uncompromised only None
Dead End Low Zero Zero None
Actions None Tailored Thorough Scans None
5.2 Analysis
In this section, the four different behavior models will be analyzed based off the number
of steps taken, the success rate, the types of actions used, and the services exploited. Each
of the behavior models were tested against two similar networks but one with a critical
misconfigurations. Each of the simulations are independent from one another and the re-
sults of one attacker on a network do not effect the others. For each test, the attacker was
simulated 1000 times and the statistics were averaged together to get an average response
from the simulator. All tests were performed on a 2013 Apple MacBook Pro with an Intel
i5 2.4GHz processor with 8GB of RAM. However timing results are not important in this
work as there is no comparable benchmark or reference.
5.2.1 Base Network Configuration
Comparing the number of attack steps each attacker performs throughout all the simulations
will illustrate not only the efficiency (how quickly the attacker achieves their goal) of the
attacker but also the variation between each of the attacker’s. Even though the attackers in
the same set of tests have the same behavior model configurations, the probabilistic nature
of the preferences and attack selection logic allows for variation between each attacker.
This variation can be seen in Figure 5.3 and the average attack steps by each of the attackers
can be seen in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Average number of steps taken by each of the attackers
Amateur Expert Comprehensive Random
Avg. Steps 27.5 27.6 54.9 47.4
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of the number of attack steps each attacker took over 1000 separate simu-
lations.





Immediately it is evident that in terms of the attack step, the amateur and expert attack-
ers are similar. The expert attacker has a slight edge over the amateur in terms of maximum
number of steps but the average steps are identical. The minimum number of steps for the
amateur and expert is 10 and 8 respectively, where the average steps was 2̃7 steps. If all the
correct steps are taken by the attacker, the best attack is significantly lower than the aver-
age. This concludes that the network being tested is too small and simple enough for even
an average amateur attacker. When the attackers are successful the two attackers perform
similarly. Examining failure rate does begin to expose the differences between these two
attackers, as shown in Table 5.6
Table 5.6: Failed attack rate for each type of attackers on the base network
Amateur Expert Comprehensive Random
% Failures 17.8 1.8 0 0
The amateur attacker failed 17.8 percent of the time given this network configuration
while the expert only failed 1.8 percent of the time. This disparity comes down to both
the skill set and the patience of the attacker. In the case of the amateur, the behavior was
configured to scan the network and then attack something that they are capable of. If the
attacker at some point targeted the guest network and compromised the machine within, the
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amateur attacker got confused and did not know how to proceed since that is a dead end.
This also occurred with the expert attacker but only if the guest network was targeted first
with a basic ping scan. This results in showing how the expert is more flexible in certain
situations based on the knowledge of the network, if the expert had any other knowledge
on the network other than that machine it does not fall into this trap.
The comprehensive and random attackers shows the network’s overall resilience to an
attacker along with what would be considered the worst possible attackers. The compre-
hensive attacker is an attacker who is trying to do as much damage as possible where the
random attacker will try anything until they are successful. Due to this, the number of at-
tack steps are much greater than the conventional amateur and expert attackers. With the
comprehensive behavior it is expected that the attack steps are higher because one of its
requirements is is to compromise every machine possible. The maximum number of steps
is high because it searches for every machine possible and attacking machines that it has
already attacked. Whereas the random attacker tries any action on any target, thus it is ex-
pected that the total steps are high. The random attacker being successful means that there
are attack paths to the goal even though some are not entirely realistic. This is a brute force
way of generating attack graphs to a goal because it will try anything to get to the goal.
Due to the both the comprehensive and random attackers not having restrictive preferences
on stopping the attack, both were successful 100 percent of the time.
The number of attack steps given this network is not a great representative of the be-
havior, just the performance of the attacker. Examining the different types of attacks the
attacker performs gives a better indication of how the attacker uses each of these steps.
Seen in Figure 5.4, the number of occurrences of the recon and breach kill chain stages are
shown for each of the attackers.
The difference between the amateur and expert attacker becomes clearer when looking
at the kill chain stages occurrences. The amateur attacker on average uses many less recon
actions than the expert attacker. The amateur attacker favored using thorough scans because
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Figure 5.4: Comparison of the occurrences of the recon and breach stages for each attacker type on
the base configured network.









Kill Chain Stage Occurrences
it yields the most information and the attacker is unaware that is easily detected. Thus the
amateur learns significant enough knowledge to immediately start attacking machines. The
behavior of the amateur was to attack multiple machines if the attacker recently discovered
and scanned them, which is shown by the significantly higher number of breach stages. The
expert in contrast is near one-to-one recon to breach actions as an expert attacker is much
more methodical in their approach. The behavior of the expert is to quietly step though the
network and learn as much information as possible. The expert also favored using the ping
scans and the connect scans for recon as they are the most covert actions. The one-to-one
mapping between recon and breach is a desirable because it shows the attacker is trying to
extract as much information out of the network as they progress.
Examining the comprehensive attacker, there is a large disparity between number of
recon stages versus the breach stages. The difference is justified because the behavior of
the attacker is to perform as much damage as possible by compromising every machine
possible, explaining the significantly more breach stages than recon. The minimum value
of breach has significance because it is the total number of machines on the network minus
one. The reason for the minus one is because the intent machine counts as an exfiltration
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stage and not a breach stage. The random attacker performs significantly more recon than
breach. This in the end comes down to the rules chosen for the fuzzy logic behavior model.
There is no direct way to randomly choose the conditions for the stages, instead greatly
overlapping variables where chosen to drive the rules. The overlapping variables and rule
set seems to favor recon more so than the breach stage.
The varying number of attack steps, failure rate, and the types of actions for each shows
the flexibility of the model describing at a high level the differences between attackers.
It can not determine the differences of skill and preferences of the attacker. This can be
achieved by examining the types of services the different types of attackers used throughout
their attacks. Figure 5.5 shows the percentage of times each service was exploited for each
attacker. It should be noted again that the amateur has restricted capabilities and the expert,
comprehensive, and random have unlimited capabilities. The expert attacker does however
have preferences over certain services.
This analysis of the attacked services provides two purposes, one to obviously examine
the individual behaviors of the attacker but also it exposes critical potential weaknesses in
the system. If there is a particular service where many of the attacks are focused on, this
raises red flags from an analyst perspective because there is a large security hole that needs
to be addressed. In Figure 5.5 the service “ubuntu linux” in particular stands out because
all but the expert attacker have a significant number of attacks on that service. Digging
deeper into why that is, two of the five externally facing machines are running a version of
Ubuntu, the DNS server and web server. Thus it makes sense that this is the most active
service because it is on the front line of machines to get attacked and is also the most
vulnerable in terms of the number of vulnerabilities it has.
It can be seen that the number types of services used by the amateur and the others are
drastically different. This comes down to the difference in capabilities between the attack-
ers. The amateur was only given select vulnerabilities to common services like Ubuntu,
SQL, and Java. Where the expert attacker has access to a wide variety of vulnerabilities
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Figure 5.5: The percentage of times a service was exploited by each of the attackers on the base
network. (Services pertaining to intent are bolded)
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comparatively. The comprehensive and random attackers have similar distribution of at-
tacks because their capabilities where not limited in anyway nor did they have preference
on any actions. The expert’s chosen services are different because there was a heavy pref-
erence on SQL, Java, Debian, RSA type services. This allows the capability to test various
different skill sets to understand how the attacker can penetrate the network.
5.2.2 Misconfigured Network
One of the goals of this work is to model the attacker and the network in way that will aid
in understanding the relationship between the two. To exploit this relationship, the network
was intentionally misconfigured to allow for a supposed to be heavily protected machine
exposed to the internet. The same exact tests from the base network will be conducted
on this less-than ideal network configuration to understand how the attacker can attack the
network. It is important to understand how a single change to the network could possibly
affect the network positively or negatively and how the attacker is affected by this change.
For this experiment, the number of attack steps are summarized in Figure 5.6, the average
number of steps are shown in Table 5.7, the failure rate in Table 5.8, and the average change
of steps between the base and the misconfigured network is shown in Table 5.9.
Table 5.7: Average number of steps taken by each of the attackers on the misconfigured network
Amateur Expert Comprehensive Random
Avg. Steps 28.8 20.4 36.5 33.5
Table 5.8: Failed attack rate for each type of attackers on the misconfigured network
Amateur Expert Comprehensive Random
% Failures 15.5 1.2 0 0
Table 5.9: Average percent change of attack steps between the base network configuration and the
misconfigured network
Amateur Expert Comprehensive Random
Avg. % Change 4.35 -26.3 -33.4 -29.1
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Figure 5.6: Comparison of the number of attack steps each attacker took over 1000 separate simu-
lations on the misconfigured network






Immediately it can be noticed that the average number of steps to achieve the goal for
the expert, comprehensive, and random attackers decreased by 26.3%, 33.4%, and 29.1%
respectively. Where the amateur attacker remained relatively unchanged and actually in-
creasing by 4.35%. This is explained by the amateur attacker simply not having the ca-
pabilities to take advantage of the security hole in the network. Which is an interesting
aspect to examine because not all attackers are made equal and regardless of how big of a
problem this misconfiguration seems, not every attacker can take advantage of it. Although
in this situation the seriousness of the hole can directly be observed by the change of the
average steps for the comprehensive and random attackers. These attackers are unguided
and randomly compromising machines and are approaching the average number of steps
for the amateur attacker. It is expected that the expert attacker to benefit greatly from this
misconfiguration but the random performing near the amateur attacker should be alarming.
Looking at the minimum steps of the attackers, it can be observed that the expert and the
random both completed their goal in 4 steps. Meaning that even when developing random
attack paths some of them were equal to the best of the expert attacker.
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The general trend from the base network for the kill chain stages applies here in the mis-
configured network seen in Figure 5.7. The amateur remains unchanged from previously,
the expert still performs recon and breach equally, comprehensive favors breach much more
than recon, and random has significantly more recon actions. The major change is the gen-
eral shift to the left for expert, comprehensive, and random where amateur stays in the same
place.
Figure 5.7: Comparison of the occurrences of the recon and breach stages for each attacker type on
the misconfigured network.









Kill Chain Stage Occurrences
Mentioned previously, by looking at the services that were exploited it is possible to
determine where some weak spots in the network are. Figure 5.8 shows the percentage of
times the attacker exploits a particular service. As defined by the network, the machine that
was misconfigured was the GitLab Development server which had two services running,
RedHat Enterprise (“enterprise linux” on figure) and GitLab. The amateur attacker did not
have the capabilities to exploit this particular machine however does still have significant
attacks on another machine also running some other version of RedHat. To show the dif-
ference between the base network and misconfigured, the percent change in the attacks on
RedHat are shown in Table 5.10.
As expected, the expert attacker benefits the most from this misconfiguration boasting
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Figure 5.8: The percentage of times a service was exploited by each of the attackers on the miscon-
figured network (Services pertaining to intent are bolded). *Service on misconfigured machine
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Table 5.10: Average percent change of attacks against the service “enterprise linux” between the
two networks
Amateur Expert Comprehensive Random
Avg. % Change -.235 384 33.7 52.1
a 384% increase in the number of attacks on RedHat compared to the base case. Then
because the expert attacker could capitalize on this vulnerability, they were able to achieve
their goal swiftly since they accessed the deepest layer of the network. The change in
attacks on RedHat for the comprehensive and random attackers backs up the decrease in
number of attack steps from previously. The comprehensive attacker only needed to com-
promise and perform a scan from the GitLab machine to access the entire network to attack.
The random attacker benefited greatly from this hole because the fewer the steps to the goal
the more likely it is to randomly choose it faster. Where as the Amateur saw no change at
all because of this vulnerability because it couldn’t take advantage of it due to capabilities.
These results are unique compared to previous works because the individual behaviors
of different types of attackers are exposed showing the effects of each other on a network.
The attack graph works seen in [44, 19, 52, 25] does have the capability to generate the
attack paths that were generated with this model based off the vulnerability data but can not
represent the critical weaknesses in a network configuration nor does it show the individual
differences between attackers. This work not only shows the attack paths taken by the
attacker but also can show the frequency at which the attacker selects certain machines and
services. The game theory works from [50, 5] do have potential to show the differences
between the attackers however to achieve this extensive expertise in game theory and cyber
security is required to configure the model to show different behaviors. These models also
assume that the knowledge of the attacker is static which limits the types of analysis that
can be performed in the sense that the researcher would not know what the attacker needed
to know to perform certain actions.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
The primary contribution of this thesis is the introduction of knowledge-based behavior
modeling to cyber attack adversary descriptions. By defining the key aspects of a cyber
attack and attacker such as the attacker’s intentions, capabilities, opportunities, and pref-
erences, it is possible to define a model that describes set of rules and attacker may have
along with the probabilistic and random nature that cyber attacks have. Cyber attackers do
not base their next actions based completely on mathematical models nor do they base their
decisions on statistics as modeled by previous works. Instead the actions are based off of
what they know about the field, the network, or goals, all of which are captured here in this
work.
With the use of the simulator CASCADES, it was shown that the vulnerabilities on a
network tell only one part of the story. Each different attacker has their own skills, person-
ality, and style that plays a different role in how the network was attacked. Four different
types of attackers were shown in this work: an amateur, an expert, a comprehensive at-
tacker, and a random attacker. Despite the amateur’s limited skill set, it was found that the
amateur attacker was equality effective at achieving the intent as a expert when success-
fully completing the simulation. When a misconfiguration was added into the network, the
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amateur was unable to capitalize on the misconfigurations where the others saw improve-
ments of up to 33%. The random attacker performed just as well as the amateur attacker on
average when there was a misconfiguration and the best attack for the random was equal to
the best attack for the expert attacker. This shows that as misconfigurations/vulnerabilities
are introduced into the network the more naive attackers benefit which negatively impacts
the overall security of the network.
This work proves to be useful for both network security analytics and cyber attack
scenario analysis. Realistic and detailed cyber attack scenario for various types of attackers
is difficult to find due to the secrecy of the field and the complexity of the data. This
provides the potential to generate various scenarios that are based on someone else or a
scenario that no one has seen before. However this model is not perfect as it can be difficult
to configure properly requiring substantial trial and error to achieve various behaviors. It
also lacks the flexibility to model extremely complex behaviors that require very precise
control logic to model. Given these limitations, the concept of applying the attacker’s
knowledge to model their behaviors has proven to be effective.
6.2 Future Work
This behavior model, although proven to be effective, certain aspects of the model could
be improved upon, expanded on, or investigated further. The future work can be broken up
in to three major parts: updating the knowledge base, the fuzzy logic kill chain selection,
and the CASCADES simulator. The knowledge base section focuses on extra knowledge
of the network or the cyber attacker that the attacker could use to make decisions that was
not presented here in this thesis. The fuzzy logic controller for the kill chain comes with its
issues can be expanded on and investigated further. Then lastly the simulation environment
performed well with this new ABM but it too could be fleshed out to provide more accurate
results using this ABM.
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6.2.1 Knowledge Upgrades
This design of a behavior model with its large focus on developing a knowledge base
throughout the attack requires a solid foundation of possible information an attacker could
learn about. This thesis provides this foundation of network knowledge needed to per-
form a realistic cyber attack simulation. Certainly not everything could be represented but
at the moment the attacker is unaware of machines that are in the same subnet from one
another. This is a critical piece of information because attacking another machine in the
same subnet is unlikely to provide you with any new significant knowledge gain. Along
with subnet modeling, the notion of assets on the network should be investigated to use
as attacker motivation or intent. At the moment the types of information an attacker can
learn is entirely based off of network configuration and not what they could gain in terms of
sensitive information. In this model, the recon model must also be reconfigured as anytime
an attacker performs a recon action perfect and complete knowledge is returned. This may
not always be the case as some recon scanning may not provide an attacker with the most
detailed information needed to perform an attack, like version detailed numbers of services
for example.
The intent of the attacker is based of the types of actions they want to perform and has
little to do with the actual reason they are attacking the network. For example, an attacker
may want to steal all the customer information off of a database server on the network.
The current model will consider this complete if a certain action is complete regardless if
it was the correct machine. If the assets, like customer data, where modeled then the attack
would not be complete until this information was exfiltrated. Lastly, the topic of social
engineering and insider threats should be researched in addressing the critical information
that can be gained. Most cyber attacks these days contain some sort of social engineering
whether it is a phishing or reading a password off of a desk. Investigation should be done
to understand the types of social engineering that could be performed and how it can be
adapted into the model.
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6.2.2 Fuzzy Logic
The fuzzy logic controller used here provided the ability to give some uncertainty to the
membership of the rules defined for each of the kill chain stages. This uncertainty brings up
its own issues as it made the simulation difficult to predict and sending the simulation into
loops in certain situations. This could be due to the stage of the kill chain be selected at the
beginning of the attack action process and it being ridged throughout the rest of the process.
The defuzzifcation process should be examined in more detail to understand how it can be
used to not aggressively pick one state over the other. A possible solution is to combine
the kill chain membership determination with the preferences to weigh actions based on
their membership to a stage instead of hard filtering out every action that is not apart of
the state. In the case of where there is a draw between absolute membership of two states
like recon and breach, this may prevent the times where the situation gets stuck selecting
nothing but recon for example. Lastly the types of kill chain stages could be expanded on
to allow for multiple different types of attacks like a phishing or automation. This allows
for any different types of attackers to be modeled.
6.2.3 CASCADES Future Work
The CASCADES simulation environment can be expanded on to allow for some of these
changes above. First more types of attacks should be addressed like phishing, trace re-
moval, or privilege escalation. A main limitation of realism in CASCADES is that it as-
sumes that every attack is a network and privilege escalation type attack. The information
to handle DoS attacks and local attacks are contained in the vulnerability database as the
CVSS data but not used at this moment. By implementing this information into the system,
this would require the attacker in some cases to first gain access to a machine as a user
and the locally gain access to the root user. Or the attacker may decide to just take down
the machine for everyone like the comprehensive attacker and perform DoS attacks only.
This sort of modeling of the network and vulnerabilities allows the capability to model
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significantly more behaviors more directly than the current model.
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Gaining Knowledge Through Reconnaissance
The main objective for an attacker is to develop the knowledge base to the point that the
attacker can achieve their intent. Thus it is important to model different methods and tools
that attackers commonly use to gain knowledge about their network. Tools like NMap,
Nessus, or even social engineering techniques reveal certain aspects of a network like ma-
chines, services, and vulnerabilities. NMap is the most widely used and accepted tool by
security professionals and attackers to perform general network reconnaissance and anal-
ysis. While this work does not try to emulate NMap, the functionality and the outputs are
adapted to this application.
In this work, four functions of NMap are replicated. The four functions are: ping scan,
port scan, TCP connect scan, and thorough scan. Ping scan reveals to the attacker which
ip addresses are on the range given by the user as seen in Algorithm 1 and port scan is
the same but with ports. TCP connect scan is similar to the port scan but will send a
TCP packet to examine the response from the target. This reveals the services that are
installed on the machine along with the open ports as seen in Algorithm 2. Then lastly the
thorough/comprehensive scan reveals all the ports and services for a range of IP addresses,
being the most effective but least stealthy methods for reconnaissance.
Algorithm 1 shows the general methodology of how the ping scan outputs are repre-
sented. The actual processes of performing the scan consists of retrieving a sorted list off
all the IP addresses in the virtual terrain and finding the indices of the IP address at the
beginning of the range given and at the end of the range. Then once the indices are found
using a binary search, a sub list of all the values between these indices is created to rep-
resent the IP addresses in the virtual terrain that is within the bounds of the scan. Then
to filter out the machines that would not respond to the scan (due to firewall permissions),
the connection between the source and the IP’s in the new sublist are evaluated. This will
examine whether or not the two machines can communicate with each other and if so it is
added to the final list to be returned to the user.
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Data: Range of IP addresses
Result: List of pinged machines
sortedIPList = sorted list of IP’s from VT;
pingedList = sortedList.subList(range);
if pingedList empty then return ∅ ;
foreach ip in pingedList do
if Source machine is external then
if ip.isExternallyV isible == false then Remove ip from pingedList;
else




Algorithm 1: Base pseudocode for a NMap Ping Scan implementation
As mentioned before the port scan is similar to the ping scan and only reveals the ports
open in the system. The TCP scan is an extension of this as the basic port scan is used as
seen in Algorithm 2. The logic for the TCP scan is also simple as a basic port scan is first
performed over a range, if and only if the source can communicate with the target. Then
for each of the ports that are open, the services that are associated on those ports are then
added to the return list. This returns a mapping between the open ports and the services
that respond on those ports which then get added into the knowledge base.
Data: A target machine and range of ports
Result: List of services on target
if Source is external and target is not externally visible then
return ∅
else
if target.canCommuicate(source) == false then return ∅ ;
end
Perform port scan;
foreach Open port do
if Port is open on target then Record the services responding on that port;
end
return list of services
Algorithm 2: Base pseudocode for a NMap TCP connect port scan to reveal the services on the
target
The thorough scan runs each of these methods to return one single data structure that
represents all the open ports and services for a range of IP addresses. This yields the most
information but takes a long time to run depending on the ranges and is also the most
detectible by intrusion detection systems.
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